



A Common PERSPECTIVE

US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center
Doctrine and Education Group's Newsletter

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Stability Operations

FROM THE EDITORS


In our last issue, we outlined some joint doctrine transformation initiatives and concept-based joint prototypes (e.g., standing joint force headquarters, effect-based operations [EBO]) that were being considered for inclusion in the revision of JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. In this issue we will build on those ideas in various articles. The first article "Lassoing SASO: A Tale of Nondoctrinal Discovery," reprinted courtesy of the *Marine Corps Gazette*, presents the issue of stability operations doctrine—as seen from a frustrated staff officer. It highlights some doctrine issues with stability operations and terminology and the use of various doctrine products and Web sites. This relates to Mr. Bob Hubner's article on page nine describing how USJFCOM JWFC developed joint stability operations doctrine and integrated accepted concepts in the revision first draft of JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, dated 15 Sep 04.


We included other articles on subjects that we believe will influence and/or contribute to the transformation of joint doctrine. Our third feature article on page 13 does an excellent job of describing the United Kingdom Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre's position on "effects." A fourth article on page 18 proposes some changes to the range of military operations and a fifth article on page 33 provides a thought provoking discussion of modernizing the "Principles of War." Our intent is to prompt thought and discussion that should bear fruit in the revision and consolidation of joint publications that are in revision now, to include JPs 3-0; 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*; and 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*.

This issue also features several updates on joint publications and doctrine organizations. There is a revision status update for JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, on page 20. Starting on page 25, there are organizational updates for JS J-7/Joint Doctrine

Branch; the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps joint doctrine shops; and the Air-Land-Sea Application (ALSA) Center. These updates contain useful information regarding the status of Service, joint, and multi-Service publications. In particular, the ALSA Center update provides a detailed status on each of its publications and projects. Further, the Air Force Doctrine Center's update discusses its recent move from Langley AFB, VA, to Maxwell AFB, AL.

The theme for our next issue will focus on "force projection." Hopefully, several members of the joint community will accept the challenge and enlighten us regarding needed changes to joint doctrine that are based on changes in Service capabilities and recent, hard-earned experiences of our warfighters. As always, articles on all pertinent joint doctrine issues and other related comments and suggestions are welcome. Our newsletter continues to serve as the one-stop source of news and information for all the joint and Service doctrine communities—a resource we continuously improve to meet your needs. Your feedback on any aspect of ACP is important and will help ensure we provide thoughtful, timely discussion on current doctrinal issues.


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MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER, USJFCOM JWFC

By MajGen Jon A. Gallinetti, USMC

Since becoming part of the USJFCOM Team and assuming command of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) this summer, I have been impressed with the range and depth of services and products the joint doctrine community provides to our warfighters. JWFC is a key part of this effort by supporting the Chairman's joint doctrine program and USJFCOM's transformation responsibilities. Our joint doctrine continues to prove its value to the joint force by providing common terms of reference that are used to rapidly plan, prepare, execute, and assess joint operations worldwide. Joint doctrine is the foundation the JWFC uses to develop joint training exercises and is the standard we use to provide feedback to the forces participating in the exercises we support year round. As good as our doctrine products are, we must continually improve them to ensure they are current and provide doctrine that meets the needs of our warfighters. We must provide the best products possible to our Service members, who are the heart of our joint forces as they continue fighting our nation's enemies worldwide.

Initiatives to share ideas in professional forums, improve the responsiveness of the joint doctrine development system, incorporate lessons learned, bring validated concepts into doctrine faster, and raise awareness of joint doctrine through training and education are paying off for our combatant commanders and joint warfighters. JWFC's Doctrine and Education Group is strengthening its linkages to joint training, lessons learned, education, and concepts to help identify the cutting edge ideas from various disciplines within the Department of Defense and to incorporate them quicker. This approach is balanced with the knowledge and lessons we have learned through our history and continue to learn from our operational forces today. We must continually evaluate and improve our doctrine to ensure our forces deter any potential adversary and dominate our enemies.

Part of sharing ideas and making improvements to joint doctrine is through your contributions to *A Common Perspective*. This newsletter provides valuable updates



on the progress being made by the Joint Doctrine Development Community in providing timely products. It also is a sounding board for new ideas that help us challenge ourselves to think through various concepts and use them to describe better ways of conducting joint operations. This edition of *A Common Perspective* includes several articles that should spur thought and debate in the joint community. This is critical since we are addressing many important issues in the revision of JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*—the revision first draft was released for worldwide review in September 2004.

I would like to highlight the effort to include stability operations in joint doctrine. We will have a substantial portion of our force focused on conducting these operations for some time. Stability operations are critical to winning the peace and providing security for our nation. We are making a significant change in our established doctrine by moving away from the War – MOOTW range of military operations to something new that will include stability operations. How this is done is important to ensure we develop a construct that adds value to our doctrine, is executable by our joint force commanders, and retains the fundamentals that have proven sound.

I look forward to our continued dialog in this newsletter and the discussions during the 34th Joint Doctrine Working Party in November 2004.



DOCTRINE AND EDUCATION GROUP UPDATES

By Col Fred Guendel, USAF, Chief, Doctrine and Education Group, USJFCOM JWFC

My first six months as the director of the Joint Warfighting Center's Doctrine and Education Group and the Doctrine Support Team (DST) have been challenging and rewarding for me. I continue to be impressed with the talent and motivation of the Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC). In the winds, or should I say the whirlwind, of change in the Department of Defense, this relatively small community continues to produce valued products for our joint warfighters. This has been proven through the various lessons learned and reports from many joint operations worldwide. Our joint doctrine is relatively mature, is well received, and it works. At the same time there are many items that need to be changed and improved to ensure we produce quality doctrine products for the joint force in a timely manner.

Our group is engaging various lessons learned, training, education, and concepts groups to identify specific areas in joint doctrine that need improvement. As these are developed we will identify the fastest on-ramps to incorporate them into joint doctrine. DST continues to provide valued support to the community by developing various products beyond the joint publications themselves. An example of this effort is the JWFC pamphlets that are being used to help get concepts and prototypes closer to doctrine products. This is an important bridge that is helping educate both doctrine and concept communities on each other's products and terminology.

As I close, I would like to welcome LTC Jim Purvis and Maj Rich Curtis. They will be valued members of our doctrine team. Maj Curtis will help us establish closer ties to the training community, as the Training Support Branch Chief and LTC Purvis will lead the Development Branch.

ASSESSMENTS BRANCH

JWFC has completed two preliminary assessments and eight formal assessments over the past six months. The preliminary assessment on JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*, recommended a formal assessment for anticipated revision and the one on JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations* recommended an early formal assessment. Two of the

formal assessments supported the "Joint Publication Consolidation Plan" and involved multiple publications. These included JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, with JP 4-01.8, *JTTP for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*; and JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*, with JP 3-14.1, *JTTP for Space Operations*. Other formal assessments completed include those on JPs 2-01.2, *Joint Doctrine and TTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations (S)*; 2-03, *JTTP for Geospatial Information & Services Support to Joint Operations*; 3-09.1, *JTTP for Laser Designation Operations*; 3-15, *Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare*; 3-51, *Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare*; and 3-59, *Joint Doctrine and TTP, for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations*.

Over the past six months, there was one request for an early/out of cycle formal assessment (JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*), which is ongoing. Currently, there are two preliminary (JPs 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*, and 3-17, *JTTP for Air Mobility Operations*), and seven other formal assessments in progress. These include the consolidations of JP 1-04, *JTTP for Legal Support to Military Operations*, with JPs 1-05, *Religious Support in Joint Operations*, and 1-06, *JTTP for Financial Management During Joint Operations*, which likely will be revisited by the JDDC; JP 2-01.1, *JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting*, with JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*; and JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, with JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*. Other ongoing formal assessments include those on JPs 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, and 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*. These will be completed over this winter and during early spring 2005. Additionally, over the next six months, the Assessment Branch will initiate three new preliminary assessments (JPs 3-09.3, *JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)*, 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, and 4-03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine*) and five new formal assessments (JPs 2-01.3, *JTTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operating in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*, 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*; and the consolidations of JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, with JPs 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, and 3-32, *Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations*, which likely will be revisited by the JDDC; and JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations*, with JP 3-57.1, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs*).

The JWFC appreciates your continued participation and feedback in the assessment and revision process. Questions should be sent to Mr. Bob Brodel, robert.brodel@jfcom.mil, DSN 668-6186 or Mr. Tom Barrows, thomas.barrows@jfcom.mil, DSN 668-6123.

DEVELOPMENT BRANCH

Over the last six months JWFC's Doctrine Support Team produced three draft publications. JP 3-07.2, *JTTP for Antiterrorism* (Revision First Draft [RFD]), was released for review on 9 April 2004; JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations* (RFD), was released for review on 15 April 2004; and JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (RFD), was released for review on 22 September 2004. JP 4-02 RFD updates health service support doctrine and follows the Joint Doctrine Consolidation Plan by combining the content of three publications (JPs 4-02, *Doctrine For Health Service Support In Joint Operations*; 4-02.1, *JTTP For Health Service Logistics Support In Joint Operations*; and 4-02.2, *JTTP For Patient Movement In Joint Operations*). JP 3-0 RFD updates the publication based on the formal assessment results and guidance from the Joint Staff. It also combines JPs 3-0 and 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, dated 16 Jun 1995, in accordance with the Joint Doctrine Consolidation Plan.

JWFC expects to produce five draft publications in the next six months. These drafts include JPs 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Revision Second Draft); 3-01, *Joint Doctrine Countering Air and Missile Threats* (RFD); 3-09, *Doctrine For Joint Fires* (RFD); 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures* (RFD); and 3-34, *Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations* (RFD). The JP 3-01 RFD will consolidate JPs 3-01, *Joint Doctrine Countering Air and Missile Threats*, 3-01.2, *Joint Doctrine For Offensive Operations For Countering Air and Missile Threats* (Final Coordination), and 3-01.3, *Joint Doctrine For Defensive Operations For Countering Air and Missile Threats* (Final Coordination). The JP 3-34 RFD will consolidate JPs 3-34, *Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*.

JWFC has eight publications in the queue for the next six to 12 months pending program directive approval and lead agent (LA) requests for assistance. These publications are: JP 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations*; consolidation of JPs 3-05.1, *JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, and 3-05.2, *JTTP for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*; JP 3-07.3, *JTTP for Peace Operations*; JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*; JP 3-07.5, *JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*;

JP 3-09.1, *JTTP for Laser Designation Operations*; JP 4-05.1, *JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization: RC Callup*; and consolidation of JPs 4-09, *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution*, 4-01.3, *JTTP for Movement Control*, and 4-01.4, *JTTP for Joint Theater Distribution*.

The above information gives you a feel for the number of publications that are starting or about to enter the development stage. This, coupled with the number of publications that are in the development phase, illustrates that we have over half of the 112 joint publications in development. That is a lot of work and there is pressure to update even more publications based on observations and lessons from recent and ongoing operations worldwide. Workload management has been an ongoing issue within the JDDC and is a major agenda item for the 34th Joint Doctrine Working Party in November 2004.

The JDDC must take a hard look at what is working and where we must make an effort to get some stagnant publications moving. We must work to ensure administrative delays are kept at a minimum (this is wasting a lot of development time right now). Major issues that are key to publication development must be resolved early in the process and taken to the "tank" for a decision if required. This guidance is clear in both approved JP 1-01 and draft CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, but we must follow it to make the system work in a timely manner. Finally, both publications also provide clear guidance on meeting and missing milestones. They require LA, Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor (JSDS), Service planners, and JS J-7 involvement when a publication is 30 days behind the development schedule prescribed in the program directive. The level of involvement is elevated higher and higher until at the 120-day mark it is brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the LA and JSDS. This process was established to ensure joint publications are developed efficiently and contentious issues are resolved quickly. We need to follow this guidance to ensure our warfighters receive quality joint doctrine in a timely manner.

For assistance, don't hesitate to contact LTC Jim Purvis, USA, james.purvis@jfcom.mil, DSN 668-6742; or MAJ Michelle Burkhart, USA, michelle.burkhart@jfcom.mil, DSN 668-6066.

INTEGRATION BRANCH

JWFC's Doctrine and Education Group recently formed an Integration Branch, currently headed by LTC Rob Lott and supported by two DST contractors. This branch collaborates with the USJFCOM's Joint Experimentation Directorate (J-9), the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) (Standards and Training), and others to identify validated, value-added ideas that could improve joint doctrine in the near term. Future additional staffing is being

(Continued on next page)

considered. In the meantime, you can contact LTC Lott, Mr. Rick Rowlett, or Mr. Tom McDaniel (see the ACP POC list on page 20) for any concept integration questions.

The branch is continuing work on the JWFC series of pamphlets intended to raise awareness, promote debate, and discuss implications of emerging, concept-based ideas. On 1 June 2004, the JWFC Commander signed **JWFC Pamphlet 5, *Operational Implications of the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)***. CIE is a current USJFCOM "prototype" associated with the SJFHQ and an important enabler for effects-based operations. On 27 June 2004, the JWFC Commander signed **JWFC Pamphlet 6, *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)***, another USJFCOM prototype. The JIACG is a multifunctional advisory element on the combatant commander's staff that facilitates planning, coordination and information sharing across the interagency community. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance the interchange between civilian and military organizations spanning the entire range of national security activity. The Concept Integration Branch has been developing **JWFC Pamphlet 7**, which will discuss **effects-based operations**. It should be published by early November 2004. You can download all approved JWFC Pamphlets at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/. Click on the "Other Publications" link in the "Global Resources" box.

USJFCOM continues to work with geographic combatant commands to implement their SJFHQ Core Element. Doctrine and Education Group supports this effort with a joint doctrine integrated product team (IPT) that routinely collaborates with an overarching "implementation" IPT on doctrine-related issues and products such as the SJFHQ Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). The draft SOP was distributed to geographic combatant commands for formal staffing in mid April 2004. The intent is to publish an approved SOP in 2004 to support the goal of fully operational SJFHQ core elements in the targeted combatant commands by the end of FY 05.

Important near-term targets for emerging concept-based ideas include JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, and JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*. The Integration Branch has recommended line-out/line-in changes for the JP 3-0 RFD, which the JS J-7 distributed for formal review and comment in mid September 2004. The RFD contains suggested text on the SJFHQ, the JIACG, the effects-based nature of planning, and effects assessment.

For assistance, contact LTC Rob Lott, USA, robert.lott@jfcom.mil, DSN 668-7142 or Mr. Rick Rowlett, ricky.rowlett@jfcom.mil, DSN 668-6167.

EDUCATION BRANCH

The newly created Education Branch of the Doctrine and Education Group continues to broaden its engagement with professional military education (PME) and JPME institutions, as well as with other combatant commands and Service organizations and their representatives around the globe. In July 2004, USJFCOM representatives presented information briefs that proposed JPME curriculum special areas of emphasis (SAEs) to the Joint Staff J-7 and attendees at the annual Joint Faculty Education Conference. The three-day conference was held at National Defense University's Industrial College of the Armed Forces at historic Ft. McNair in Washington, DC. Among the many attendees were administrators, staff and faculty, and representatives from national and Service colleges. Many topics were presented, considered, and discussed as possible SAE presentations for the upcoming Military Education Coordination Council meeting this fall.

JWFC's Doctrine and Education Group hosted a USJFCOM Faculty Orientation and Development Conference in September 2004. Seven PME and JPME institutions sent staff and faculty members to learn more about USJFCOM and to further discuss topics ranging from emerging joint concepts and issues to lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). This conference also was available via video teleconferencing to institutions where interest was high.

Also, in September 2004, members from the Education Branch traveled to the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA, to attend their annual faculty development conference. At this conference, attendees made presentations directly to the faculty to increase awareness and understanding of a wide variety of topics. Both conferences were very successful and well received by all that attended.

In addition to the numerous conferences attended over the past six months, members of the Education Branch and selected USJFCOM representatives visited various institutions and organizations during the summer. An effort was made to impart the USJFCOM's message that PME, and JPME in particular, at all levels, in all branches, at all grades, is vital to the successful transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States and successful future operations.

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LASSOING SASO: A Tale of Nondoctrinal Discovery

by the MSTP Staff Support

Add SASO to your list of acronyms.

Maj Jason Planswell of G-3 (current ops) was ahead of his "to do" list for once. To celebrate he intended to leverage the impending lunch hour for some long-delayed physical training (PT). This would be his first such opportunity in 2 weeks. Grabbing his gym bag he moved quickly and stealthfully through the cubicle labyrinth that counted for office space at Marine expeditionary force headquarters. He was mere moments away from 11/2 hours worth of fresh air and exercise when he heard a voice calling his name. It was his branch head. "You're on the commanding general's schedule for 1600," he said. "The general wants to know about SASO (stability and support operations). Apparently, it's some sort of new Army term. I have never heard it. Neither has the general. I won't be able to make the brief, so be sure to back brief me."

SASO? SASO? The frustrated athlete ran the acronym through his mind several times during the retreat to his workplace. He had never heard of the term either. But he knew there were many resources for finding definitions for military terms. His spirits rose precipitously when he imagined himself quickly discovering the answer and being fully prepared for his audience with the general. "I may yet get a short run in," he thought to himself.

Almost by instinct he began on the web by accessing the joint electronic library (JEL) at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>. It contains an electronic version of Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. If SASO were an approved joint term or acronym it would be there. J-7, the Joint Staff, regularly updates the JEL. It is the best starting point when trying to decipher unfamiliar military jargon. Unfortunately, SASO was not listed either as a term or an acronym. That meant it didn't exist in current and approved joint doctrine.

The next logical step in his search was Marine Corps doctrine. He checked Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-12C (MCRP 5-12C), *Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and MCRP 5-12A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*. Both thin volumes are about 6 years old but remain valuable references. The Marine Corps Supplement contains terminology and acronyms unique to the Marine Corps. Terms and acronyms found in JP 1-02 are not duplicated in MCRP 5-12C. MCRP 5-12A offers definitions for operational terms used by the Army and Marine Corps, along with depictions of map symbols or graphics where appropriate. It does duplicate definitions provided in JP 1-02. Maj Planswell did not take long in learning there was no mention of SASO in either publication. This short-fused tasker was going to take a little longer than he first thought. His hope of squeezing in a run was dwindling.

Army doctrine, the next destination in his search for SASO, is voluminous. Incredibly, except for Field Manual 100-5-1 (FM 100-5-1), *Operational Terms and Graphics*, which he had already checked under its alias of MCRP 5-12A, the Army does not have a dictionary of military terms. Each publication has a glossary of course, but there are about 225 Army doctrinal pubs. He didn't have time to check each one. He did, however, have time to check the higher order publications and when he did, he hit pay dirt.

The daddy of all Army pubs is FM 3-0, *Operations*. Formerly known as FM 100-5, it contains the official version of how the Army intends to fight. It is updated regularly—often with wholesale changes in the way the Army sees itself. The latest edition, published in June 2001, places all operations into one of four categories—offense, defense, stability, or support. (See Figure 1.) A companion piece, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, was published the following year. It further develops the concept for stability operations and support operations. Jason felt he was getting closer to an answer. SASO must have something




Figure 1. Army View of the Operational Spectrum from FM 3-0.

(Continued on next page)

to do with stability operations and support operations, but his deductions were not substantiated in either the text or the glossaries of these two key pieces of Army doctrine. He couldn't go to the general with his best guess. He needed confirmation. "Besides," he thought to himself, "the acronym for stability and support operations should be SOSO or SOASO, right?"

All hopes for an afternoon run had disappeared after Jason exhausted the official sources. SASO was not an official military acronym. To learn more he would have to resort to unofficial sources. Turning to the Internet search engine Google, he found SASO could mean the Saudi Arabia Standards Organization, Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory, or the first name of a particularly well-published academic in Slovenia. He also learned that the US Army had been using the acronym SASO to represent stability and support operations in briefing slides, after-action reports, and articles in professional journals for several years. It was clear to him after reviewing the variety of products available that SASO is a synonym for what the Marine Corps and the joint community have identified as "military operations other than war," or MOOTW.

JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, lists 18 different types of MOOTW. (See Figure 2.) Thirteen of these types are listed in FM 3-0 as types of stability and support operations. The remaining five types (italicized in the figure) involve roles, missions, and capabilities not currently resident in the Army. By comparison, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 (MCDP 1-0), *Marine Corps Operations*, signs up Leathernecks for all except consequence management.¹

SASO has also become an umbrella term for current ground combat operations in Iraq. It is used in the sense that forces transitioned from offensive operations to stability and support operations after the liberation of Baghdad.

The Marines who recently relieved Army units in the Sunni Triangle underwent "SASO" training in preparation for their mission. Some Marines have mistakenly identified SASO as "stability and security operations." Jason

	<i>JP 3-0</i>	<i>Army (FM 3-0)</i>	<i>Marines (MCDP 1-0)</i>
1.	Arms control	X	X
2.	Combating terrorism	X	X
3.	Consequence management		
4.	Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations	X	X
5.	Domestic support operations	X	X
6.	<i>Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations</i>		X
7.	<i>Enforcing exclusion zone</i>		X
8.	<i>Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight</i>		X
9.	Foreign humanitarian assistance	X	X
10.	Nation assistance	X ⁽¹⁾	X
11.	Noncombatant evacuation operations	X	X
12.	Peace operations	X	X
13.	<i>Protection of shipping</i>		X
14.	<i>Recovery operations</i>		X
15.	Show-of-force operations	X	X
16.	Strikes and raids	X	X
17.	Support to counterinsurgency	X ⁽²⁾	X
18.	Support to insurgency	X	X
Remarks: (1) Nation assistance includes security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), humanitarian and civic assistance. (2) Support to counterinsurgency is part of FID per Army doctrine.			

Figure 2. Stability Operations and Support Operations in Doctrine.

mentally rehearsed his brief on the way to the general's office. He now had a handle on SASO. He hoped it was what the old man needed. It was 1559 and 45 seconds when the gentleman with the stars on his collar poked his head out of his office. "Come on in, Jason," he said. Then before the action officer had a chance to reply, he added, "I know we had a brief scheduled. But I've been working continuously since 0530 this morning. Would you mind telling me about SASO as we run 3 or 4 miles? I hate missing PT." Maj Planswell answered with the only appropriate combination of words possible, "Aye aye, Sir. I'll be ready in 5 minutes." He hoped his enthusiasm wasn't too obvious.

Note

¹ The Marine Corps retains an organic consequence management capability in the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force and could task organize other units for a consequence management mission. It is not clear why MCDP 1-0 does not reflect that fact.



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DEVELOPING JOINT STABILITY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

By Mr. Bob Hubner, USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Team, Catapult Technology Ltd.

BACKGROUND

This article is a focused update (on stability operations) to my article in the previous *A Common Perspective* titled "Transforming Our Doctrine For Joint Operations." In that article, I explained that "defining and describing 'stability operations' and placing it in the context of joint operations will be the center piece in transforming JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Doing so was directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and prompted by lessons learned from recent operations. Six months later, USJFCOM JWFC has formally proposed "fresh stability operations doctrine" with the release of the JP 3-0 revision first draft (RFD). The results were somewhat surprising given the initial guidance, but hopefully, appropriate. Let me explain.

PRIMARY SOURCES AND GUIDANCE

Army Doctrine. The US Army has established doctrine on stability (and support) operations. That doctrine is provided in Chapter 9 of FM 3-0, *Operations*, and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Its foundation was the 1997 *National Military Strategy* which stated:

"To defend and protect US national interests, our national military objectives are to promote peace and stability and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries."

Consequently, the Army described stability operations as operations that *promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis*. Support operations were described as operations that *employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering*.

Generally, the types of Army stability operations and support operations (SOSO) covered most of the joint construct for military operations other than war (MOOTW).

This view is illustrated in Figure 1 along with the differences. Note that Army support operations are shown in *italics* and include consequence management. Also, the blocked portions are really different labels for the same operations. Further, most of the MOOTW items in gray text are not part of the Army's SOSO since they are focused on other Service capabilities and the Army describes strikes and raids as offensive type of operations.

Lessons Learned. Approved JP 3-0 outlines a campaign/major operations model that has four phases—engage/deter, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. The lessons learned from recent major operations, particularly from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), indicate a critical role for stability operations in all campaign/major operation phases that return the adversary's territory to peace and normalcy, but especially in the current transition phase. These operations may include peace operations, counterinsurgency operations, antiterrorism and counterterrorism, information operations, civil-military operations, nation assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, arms control, enforcement of sanctions, and strikes and raids, among other possibilities. It has become clear that these operations may be as decisive as combat operations in achieving the desired end state. Further, we have learned that early, thorough interagency planning for the transition phase should not be delayed and is equally as important as that for defeating enemy forces.¹ Furthermore, this planning is essential to permit development of supporting plans, preparation, staging, and execution of stability operations in a timely manner (i.e., stability operations may be required in some areas before the decisive operations phase has passed).

Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC). This JOC defines stability operations as "military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability." It articulates how a future joint force commander (JFC) plans, prepares, deploys, employs, and sustains a joint force conducting stability operations that precede, occur during, and follow major combat operations. It allows for four distinct cases, however, it only specifically addresses Case 2—a **hostile nation-state acts in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the United States and its allies or employs a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior**. Essentially, this JOC states that the joint force will conduct stability operations in all campaign/major operations phases to achieve the strategic national or coalition goals associated with the sustainment or establishment of effective local governance. In the engage/deter phase, the JFC's focus is stability operations
(Continued on next page)

COMPARING CONSTRUCTS

MOOTW	USA SOSO
Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3)	Peace Operations
Arms Control (JP 3-40)	Arms Control
Combating Terrorism (JP 3-07.2)	Combating Terrorism
DOD Support to Counterdrug (JP 3-07.4)	Support to Counterdrug
Support to Insurgency (JP 3-07)	Support to Insurgencies
Show of Force	Show of Force
NEOs (JP 3-07.5)	NEOs
Domestic Support (JP 3-26.2)	Domestic Support
FHA (JP 3-07.6)	FHA
Nation Assistance (JP 3-07.1)	FID
Support to Counterinsurgency	Security Assistance
	HA and Civic Assistance
Consequence Management	
Enforcement of Sanctions/MIO	
Enforcing Exclusion Zones	
Ensuring Freedom of Navigation/ Overflight	
Protection of Shipping	
Recovery Operations	
Strikes and Raids	

Legend
MOOTW—military operations other than war
SOSO—stability operations and support operations
NEOs—noncombatant evacuation operations
FHA—foreign humanitarian assistance
FID—foreign internal defense
HA—humanitarian assistance
MIO—maritime interception operations

Figure 1. Comparing Constructs

to prevent the need for combat. During the seize the initiative and decisive operations phases, the JFC conducts stability operations to ensure the uninterrupted continuation of combat operations and to create conditions favorable for the success of postconflict operations. In the transition phase, "restorative" stability operations include both security and civil-military operations in support of civilian agencies and organizations to achieve the political objectives of the operation. The transitions of the military role from supported to supporting and perhaps back again are a critical component of both unity of effort and coherency of action. This JOC also outlines how to address total, limited, and greedy "spoilers."²

Program Directive (PD) Joint Working Group (JWG). The JP 3-0 revision PD of 12 May 2004 does not indicate explicitly how or where to incorporate stability operations. It only states that the early revision of JP 3-0 was prompted largely by a need to address the subject as directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, there was some key initial guidance provided to the lead agent during the JP 3-0 PD JWG held at USJFCOM JWFC in March 2004. The consensus was to address stability operations in the context of security cooperation and deterrence, small-scale operations, and campaigns and major operations—the proposed new

range of military operations proposed to replace MOOTW to war. It also was decided not to add a "stability phase" to the notional campaign phases currently described in JP 3-0. In other words, embed stability operations, do not replace or significantly add to another construct (i.e., MOOTW, campaign phases)—a low profile approach. However, after further discussion on whether the Chairman's intent would be met, the JWG was later convinced to directly introduce stability operations through a paragraph on "major forms of operations" (i.e., offense, defense, stability, and support or ODSS). This idea ultimately complicated development of the JP 3-0 RFD within the time available.

SEARCHING FOR A JOINT STABILITY OPS CONSTRUCT

The initial approach was to comply with the PD JWG guidance and combine the views provided in the sources described above. Stability operations in the JP 3-0 RFD would be addressed as those operations conducted as stand-alone security cooperation and deterrence actions/ small-scale operations or as part of a campaign/major operation that were designed to promote or return to peace and normalcy. For example, peace operations would be identified as both small-scale operations and stability operations; and the combination of civil-military, information, and counterinsurgency operations, etc., or "postconflict operations" in the transition phase of a campaign/major operation; also would be labeled stability operations. The term would be applied flexibly when the purpose (i.e., promoting or returning to peace and normalcy) fit the operation(s). Further, the idea that stability operations should be conducted throughout a campaign/major operation would be reinforced with separate paragraphs on stability operations considerations while discussing the individual phases of campaigns/major operations.

As the JP 3-0 RFD was developed, the above steps were taken and text for the "Major Forms of Operations" (i.e., ODSS) per the PD was developed and inserted in Chapter II, "Fundamentals of Joint Operations." That text

included the description, characteristics, conduct, and types of ODSS operations. Further, the relative primacy of ODSS in each phase of a joint campaign/major operation was mentioned and illustrated in the discussion on phasing.

While working with all of the new text, it became clear that there was a clash of constructs that could not be resolved within the time available to develop the RFD. The ODSS construct crosscut the range of military operations. The types of stability operations were consistent with some of the security cooperation and deterrence activities and small-scale operations, but the other portions (offense, defense, and support) seemed unnecessary. For example, support operations were the same as the civil support mission associated with DOD support to homeland security (HS) (now addressed in a new chapter) and they were not accounted for in the range of military operations. Further, approaching a campaign/major operation design using relative applications of ODSS seemed at odds with the current JP 3-0 doctrine that **"JFCs integrate and synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint**

campaigns and major operations." Therefore, the effort to directly address stability operations in the context of ODSS was abandoned given the construct conflict and time available. A more compatible approach was needed.

THE JP 3-0 RFD SOLUTION

The range of military operations has always been a key element of JP 3-0 and it, along with operational art, provides the majority of structural elements to which the doctrine is affixed. Note: Current JP 3-0 has two chapters addressing the range elements of MOOTW and war. Therefore, rather than introducing the ODSS construct as a framework for joint operations and the publication, it was decided to further modify the range of military operations. Since MOOTW was being eliminated and homeland security (HS) introduced, stability operations (and DOD support to HS) were good substitutes for MOOTW in terms of types of operations (see Figure 1). Hence, the Range of Military Operations construct illustrated in Figure 2 was developed and included in the JP 3-0 RFD.

The various types of MOOTW were captured in the new range of military operations; however, that portion of




Figure 2. Range of Military Operations

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the solution essentially repackaged approved doctrine in new terms. The task to provide "fresh stability operations doctrine" was not nearly complete. What the warfighters really seemed to need was guidance on planning for and incorporating stability operations in a joint campaign or operation, i.e., in each phase and especially the transition or postconflict operations phase. Consequently, the following features, among some others, were built into the JP 3-0 RFD.

- Stability operations was defined as **"an overarching term encompassing specific types of developmental, cooperative, or coercive security cooperation and deterrence activities, small-scale operations, and/or missions that promote local or regional normalcy and protect US interests abroad. Stability operations may be conducted in all operational environments and during all phases of a campaign or major operation."**
- Stability operations can be stand-alone operations (i.e., peace operations) or part of a campaign or major combat operation (i.e., support to counterinsurgency).
- Stability operations likely will be more prominent in the deter/engage and transition phases of a joint campaign or operation.
- Stability operations considerations for each phase of a major combat operation were provided in separate paragraphs.
- Stability operations were singled out and recognized as a segment (along with "transfer to another authority" and "redeployment") of postconflict operations in the transition phase.
- Stability operations considerations in the transition (i.e., postconflict operations) phase emphasized the importance of early and thorough planning that is coordinated with the planning for other operations in each phase—stability operations planning should not be delayed or deferred.
- Stability operations execution in the transition phase may need to begin in some portions of an operational area before combat operations are complete.
- Stability operations may be conducted in support of other US diplomatic, United Nations, or host-nation efforts.
- Stability operations were linked to information operations, nonlinear operations, noncontiguous operational areas, and operational protection.

- Stability operations may be decisive in attaining the national desired end state.

CONCLUSION

The resulting joint stability operations construct and doctrine provided in the JP 3-0 RFD is a good start. The joint doctrine development process must be trusted to adequately refine this beginning. That, however, will require command interest and due diligence on the part of the joint doctrine development community.

ENDNOTES

¹ Derived from Col Paul F. Dicker, "Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM," Center for Strategic Leadership—Student Issue Paper, July 2004, Vol S04-02, pp 7-8.

² USJFCOM/J9, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept* (Draft Working Paper), Version 0.85, 16 Dec 03; and LTC Cal, *Joint Concept Summaries*, Joint Concept Branch, Concept Development Division, Concepts Development & Experimentation Directorate, TRADOC Futures Center, Tab C.



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- **Joint Policy and Doctrine Library** - Contains DOD and joint policy and joint doctrine.
- **Consequence Management Library** - Includes Federal, Interagency, and DOD policy, doctrine, guidance, and other papers related to consequence management operations.

Questions should be referred to Mr. Chuck McGrath at (757) 203-6105 or Mr. Jim Shell at (757) 203-6121. DSN is 668.

THE UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY VIEW OF EFFECTS—DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS

Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre Position Paper

Introduction. The perpetually changing global environment creates new, developing, and complex security issues. To address these issues, the UK military must continue to evolve the current British approach to military operations.¹ This builds on the strong foundations of the manoeuvrist approach² and the principles of war³ but requires a more holistic way of influencing the *will* and *capability* of adversaries, allies, and neutrals alike, at any level of war⁴ and within all the dimensions of the strategic environment.⁵ This approach will be based on effects, as envisaged initially within the Joint Vision,⁶ expanded upon in *Defence Strategic Guidance 2003*,⁷ and discussed in the *Defence White Paper 2003*.⁸ However, the conceptual basis for effects has not yet been elaborated. To enable such an effects-based approach, there must be clearly understood and endorsed definitions of effects terminology and relationships; this paper provides such a baseline for the development of an effects-based operational concept (EBOC),⁹ which will be completed by the end of 2004.

Aim. The aim of this paper is to establish the authoritative definitions and relationships of effects to provide coherence for existing and future work.

(1) The **Strategic Aim** is attained by achieving one or more **Objectives**

Definitions. To provide firm foundations for the conceptual framework of effects, the terms strategic aim, objective, effect, and action must be defined and their relationships determined. These definitions must extend beyond those given in the dictionary and JWP 0-01.1, *United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*,¹⁰ so they usefully support the effects concept, since in an effects context a number of additional issues must be considered. First, effects and actions can occur at any level of war. Second, since effects can manifest themselves within all seven dimensions of the strategic environment, actions in one dimension may result in effects in other dimensions. Third, effects can be realised by (and influence) any actor (military or nonmilitary).¹¹ The **basic definitions** are, therefore, enhanced as follows:

Strategic Aim – A single, unambiguous purpose attained by the achievement of one or more objectives.


Objective – The intended state of affairs to be achieved by the aggregation of specified effect(s).

Effect – The physical or cognitive consequence(s) at any level within the strategic environment of one or more military or nonmilitary actions.

Action – The process of doing or acting at any level.

Relationships. From these definitions we can represent various relationships as follows:

BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC AIM AND OBJECTIVES:



Example 1. Create secure and stable conditions for the permanent governance of Country A that respects the rule of law, individual and human rights, and is able to establish normal constructive diplomatic relations with neighboring nations (Strategic Aim) by:


- Establishing and maintaining the conditions necessary to preserve Country A's territorial integrity (Strategic Objective).
- Assisting in the establishment of a loyal, trained, and disciplined National Armed Forces (Strategic Objective).
- Assisting in realization of the conditions necessary for the construction of Country A's gas pipeline (Strategic Objective).

(Note: This is not an exhaustive list of Objectives required to attain such an extensive Strategic Aim.)

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BETWEEN OBJECTIVES AND EFFECTS:

(1) An **Objective** is an aggregation of **Effects**.




Example 2. Assist in realization of the conditions necessary for the construction of Country A's gas pipeline (strategic objective) is an aggregation of:

- Gas pipeline workers are reassured of their safety (Effect 1).
- Warlord A is convinced to support construction of gas pipeline (Effect 2).
- Warlord B is coerced to accept construction of gas pipeline (Effect 3).


BETWEEN EFFECTS AND ACTIONS:

(1) Conduct an **Action** in order that an **Effect** is realized.




Example 3. Re-establish power and water supplies to Warlord A areas of influence (Action) in order that Warlord A is convinced to support construction of gas pipeline (Effect).

(2) Multiple independent **Actions** can be required in order that a single **Effect** is realized.




Example 4. Re-establish power and water supplies to Warlord A areas of influence (Action 1), protect delivery of humanitarian aid to Warlord A populations (Action 2), rebuild destroyed bridge to link Warlord A areas of influence (Action 3) in order that Warlord A is convinced to support construction of gas pipeline

(3) An **Action** can be required to realize a further **Action** in order that an **Effect** is realized.




Example 5. Refurbish desalination plant (Action 1) to re-establish water supplies to Warlord A areas of influence (Action 2) in order that Warlord A is convinced to support construction of gas pipeline (Effect).

(4) Multiple **Actions** can be required to realize an **Action** in order that an **Effect** is realized.



Example 6. Provide fuel for generators (Action 1), generate power (Action 2), refurbish desalination plant (Action 3), escort water convoys (Action 4) to reestablish power and water supplies to Warlord A areas of influence (Action 5) in order that Warlord A is convinced to support construction of gas pipeline (Effect).

(5) Conduct a single **Action** in order that multiple **Effects** are realized.



Example 7. Re-establish power and water supplies to Warlord A areas of influence (Action) in order that Warlord A is convinced to support construction of gas pipeline (Effect 1), Warlord B is persuaded to co-operate with Allied Forces (Effect 2), HA organisations convinced to provide medical aid (Effect3).


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(6) An **Effect** can be required to realize that another **Effect** is realized, particularly where the different Effects influence different parties.



Example 8. Re-establish power and water supplies to Warlord A areas of influence (Action) in order that local population is persuaded to continue supporting Warlord A (Effect 1) in order that Warlord A is convinced to support construction of gas pipeline (Effect 2).


(7) An **Effect** realized as a result of an **Action**, plus another distinct **Action** can be required in order that an **Effect** is realized.



Example 9. Re-establish power and water supplies to Warlord A areas of influence (Action 1) in order that local population is persuaded to continue supporting Warlord A (Effect 1) and protect delivery of humanitarian aid to Warlord A populations (Action 2) in order that Warlord A is convinced to support construction of gas pipeline (Effect 2).

Classification of Effects. Effects can be intended/unintended, desired/undesired, decisive/enabling, positive/negative, instantaneous/delayed, localised/distributed, permanent/temporary, or a combination thereof. Therefore there is a need to define more accurately and to classify each individual effect. There is no intention to produce an exhaustive list of effects although a list of the more frequently applicable effects may be appropriate; an issue that will be investigated in future work.

Complexity. The complexity of the action/effect/objective/strategic aim relationships becomes apparent. This complexity is increased by the fact that at any level any action (military or nonmilitary) can result in an effect at any level (not necessarily at the same level as the action) within any of the dimensions of the strategic environment and objectives can be identified at any level. In diagrammatic terms, this complex interrelationship, for a given situation, may be represented as shown on the next page.



- Notes:
- (1) Effects can take place in any of the 7 dimensions of the Strategic Environment.
 - (2) Actions can be military or non-military.
 - (3) Sub-scripts; s=strategic, o=operational, t=tactical.

Conclusion. The definitions and relationships described in this paper provide a coherent basis for effects-based work and will provide the foundation for the EBOC.



ENDNOTES

¹ BDD, Chapter 3.

² BDD, Page 3-5. *The manoeuvrist approach to operations is one in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel, is paramount.*
(Endnotes continued on page 40)

CHANGING THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS TO ACHIEVE FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE

By LTC Jim Purvis, USA, USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine and Education Group

Disclaimer: This article represents the professional opinion of the author and does not represent the official position of US Joint Forces Command or the Joint Warfighting Center

There is a large body of guidance that is driving changes in our joint doctrine. National security strategy, national military strategy, joint operations concepts, and supporting operational and functional concepts are just a few examples. There also is pressure to drive joint action to the lowest tactical level practical. Another major force changing our doctrine is the lessons we are learning or relearning in current operations around the world. All of these will require the joint doctrine community to take a hard look at existing doctrinal constructs and prepare to change them in our joint publications.

ROMO—NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE

We are moving away from military operations other than war (MOOTW) as a significant construct in joint doctrine upon which a lot of other elements of doctrine are based. This is occurring because new terminology and concepts are displacing it and there is questionable usefulness of “MOOTW” in the current operational environment and predicted future environment. As we move away from this general term there are second and third order effects on what we have known as the “range of military operations (ROMO)” and

classifying types of operations that have been associated with MOOTW. The ROMO encompasses war to MOOTW in current joint doctrine. The construct of war and MOOTW as the ROMO has served us well but it is time to move to something that is more reflective of future joint operations, incorporates useful concepts, and follows policy guidance.

As we develop terminology and a construct that describes ROMO, we must ensure we develop something that is useful to the commanders, staffs, and operating forces as they conduct operations that require full spectrum dominance. This is one of the key items being tackled in the revision of JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) 023-03 dated 28 Jan 03 provided an Interim ROMO (Figure 1). It is very comprehensive, but is limiting in the development of doctrine in two key ways. The first limitation is that it incorporates MOOTW in its design. The second is that it is an extensive list of mission areas that are not grouped in a manner that sets up a construct for applying military capabilities that achieve objectives during the conduct of joint operations.

The following is a proposed methodology to incorporate policy guidance, apply some rigor to terminology, and provide a taxonomy that is useful to joint warfighters. The terms that will need to be defined or redefined in this construct are spectrum of conflict, ROMO, full spectrum operations, and full spectrum dominance.




Figure 1. JROC-Interim Range of Military Operations

SETTING THE STAGE—WHAT ARE THE GOALS?

The enduring US security goals are to provide a secure homeland and protect our national interests globally. These goals are derived from the Constitution of the United States and its preamble—to provide for the common defense. The President has established four security policy goals as transformational in the 2002 *National Security Strategy* to accomplish our enduring security requirements. They are **assure** our allies and friends; **dissuade** future military competition; **deter** threats against US interests, allies, and friends; and decisively **defeat** any adversary if deterrence fails. These four goals are found in other documents, to include the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 2003 *Security Cooperation Guidance* from the Secretary of Defense, and the FY 04-09 *Defense Planning Guidance*.

In military doctrine we currently recognize four instruments of national power (**diplomatic, informational, military, and economic** [DIME]). The US Government (The President, with his cabinet and advisors, and Congress) integrate and use DIME in various ways to accomplish the general security goals and ensure the enduring national security goals (Defend the Homeland and Protect National Interests) are achieved. These elements are combined in Figure 2 to provide a graphical depiction that shows each instrument of national power must be integrated into each security goal for an integrated strategy to defend the homeland and protect our national interests.

As shown in Figure 2, the military works as one instrument of national power and it must be integrated with other instruments. To accomplish this integration, the military interacts with the other governmental and nongovernmental agencies to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions, and to identify the ways in which military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other for unified action. Each combatant commander works with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the




Figure 2. Integrated Strategy

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other combatant commanders to coordinate their actions and ensure those actions support and accomplish the President's strategic objectives. The integration of DIME to achieve objectives is happening at lower levels, or at least there is a greater understanding that small unit or individual actions at tactical levels can impact other instruments of national power at all levels of war.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Theoretically, the spectrum of conflict runs from a tranquil peace to declared full-scale war that determines the very existence of a national entity. For the United States, this state of peace or war is not controlled by the military. The US Constitution limits the authority to declare war to Congress. The military advises the commander in chief (CINC), but only the Congress formally determines the nation's state of peace or war. The military conducts operations that are coordinated with other instruments of national power as directed by the CINC and the Secretary of Defense within this spectrum of conflict (peace and war).

We also must recognize that since the end of World War II our civilian leadership has directed a wide variety of military actions without a formal declaration of war. This is a more than 50-year trend with no expectation of any change in the future. We must recognize this reality in our military doctrine and understand we are continuously conducting operations in that area of conflict between peace and war. Still the spectrum of conflict is important to help define the relationship between it and the ROMO.

(Continued on page 38)

REVISING JP 5-00.2, JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES

By Mr. Jon A. Gangloff, USJFCOM JWFC,
Doctrine Support Team, Cornerstone Industry, Inc.

BACKGROUND

- Current JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, was signed on 13 January 1999. At that time, the Joint Staff (JS) Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) was both the lead agent (LA) and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS).
- An interim assessment of JP 5-00.2 was conducted in CY 2000. The assessment report forwarded to the JS J-7 in December 2000 recommended that JP 5-00.2 should begin revision at its five-year anniversary (i.e., during CY 2004).
- A formal assessment was completed in April 2004. The formal assessment report prompted release of a draft revision program directive by the JS J-7 for preliminary coordination in August 2004. Responses are due back to the JS J-7 by 29 October 2004. The formal assessment recommended, and JS J-7/Joint Education and Doctrine Division agreed, that USJFCOM would become the LA with the JS J-7 remaining as the JSDS.

PROPOSED CHANGES

- Add sections on **stability operations** and **operational protection**—these sections will be based on lessons learned from recent operations and subsequent changes incorporated through the ongoing revision of JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
- Update the current section(s) on information operations—update will be based on changes incorporated through the ongoing fast-track revision of JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.
- Add a section on the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and maturing future concepts (e.g., effects-based operations).

- Revise Chapter IX, "Joint Task Force Plans and Policy," to reflect the latest guidance on the phases of deliberate and crisis action planning.
- Address the role of US Northern Command as it relates to joint task forces, to include a discussion on homeland security.
- Enhance the sections on the lead nation concept and distributed and split-based operations.
- Add sections on information management and liaison officer roles and responsibilities.
- Update/modify as required to ensure consistency with joint doctrine and JTTP approved since 13 January 1999.

CONCLUSIONS

- JP 5-00.2 will be revised in accordance with the approved JS J-7 program directive.
- During the revision process, the Joint Doctrine Development Community will have the opportunity to review all JP 5-00.2 drafts and make recommendations for improvement.
- The USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine and Education Group's POC and author for the revision of JP 5-00.2 are Mr. Steve Senkovich and Mr. Jon Gangloff respectively. See page 22 for POC information.



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JOINT PUBLICATION STATUS

APPROVED SINCE MAY 1, 2004

PUB#	TITLE
1-05 Rev1	Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
2-01 Rev1	Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations
3-40	Joint Doctrine for Combating WMD
3-52 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

SCHEDULED FOR APPROVAL OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1-01 Rev2	Joint Doctrine Development System (will be published as CJCSI 5120.02)
1-04	JTTP for Legal Support to Military Operations
3-02.1	JTTP for Landing Force Operations (as MTTP)
3-02.2	JTTP for Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation (as MTTP)
3-08 Rev 1	Interagency Coordination During Joint Ops (I & II)
3-12 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
3-13 Rev1 ^{C5}	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-26	Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security
3-61 Rev1	Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations
4-01.6 Rev1	JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)
4-05 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
6-0 Rev1 ^{C13}	Doctrine for BCS Support to Joint Operations
6-02 Rev1 ^{C13}	Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical C4 Systems
3-63	Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations

IN ASSESSMENT OVER NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1**	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the US
1-06**	JTTP for Financial Mgmt During Joint Operations
2-0**	Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Ops
2-01.3**	JTTP for JIPB
3-03**	Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations
3-06**	Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations
3-09.3*	JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)
3-11**	Joint Doctrine for Operations in NBC Environments
3-16 ^{A1}	Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations
3-30*	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
3-53*	Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
3-57 ^{A2}	Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations
4-0**	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
4-01*	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
4-03*	Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine

* Preliminary assessment ** Formal Assessment

^{A1} Consolidated formal assessment with JP 4-08

^{A2} Consolidated formal assessment with JP 3-57.1

^{C1} Incorporates JP 3-07 ^{C2} Incorporates JPs 3-01.2 and 3-01.3

^{C3} Consolidation as JPs 3-05.1 ^{C4} Consolidation as JP 3-10

^{C5} Incorporates JP 3-13.1 ^{C6} Incorporates JP 3-14.1

IN REVISION OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations
2-01.2	Joint Doctrine, TTP for Counterintelligence Ops
2-03 Rev1	JTTP for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations
3-0 Rev3 ^{C1}	Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-01 Rev1 ^{C2}	Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats
3-05.1 Rev1 ^{C3}	JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Ops
3-05.2 Rev2 ^{C3}	JTTP for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning
3-07.2 Rev1	JTTP for Antiterrorism
3-07.3 Rev1	JTTP for Peace Operations
3-07.5 Rev1	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
3-09	Doctrine for Joint Fire Support
3-09.1	JTTP for Laser Designation Operations
3-10 Rev1 ^{C4}	Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
3-10.1 Rev1 ^{C4}	JTTP for Base Defense
3-14 Rev1 ^{C6}	Joint Doctrine for Space Operations
3-15 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare
3-34 Rev1 ^{C7}	Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-35 ^{C8}	Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations
3-50 Rev1 ^{C9}	Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery
3-51 Rev 1	Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
3-54 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
3-58 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
3-59 Rev1	JTTP for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support
3-60 Rev 1 ^{C10}	Joint Doctrine for Targeting
4-01.2 Rev1	JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations
4-01.3 Rev2 ^{C11}	JTTP for Movement Control
4-01.4 Rev1 ^{C11}	JTTP for Joint Theater Distribution
4-01.7 Rev1	JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations
4-01.8 Rev1 ^{C8}	JTTP for Joint RSOI
4-02 Rev1 ^{C12}	Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
4-02.1 Rev1 ^{C12}	JTTP for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations
4-02.2 Rev1 ^{C12}	JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations
4-04 Rev1 ^{C7}	Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
4-05.1 Rev1	JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: RC Callup
4-06 Rev1	JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations
4-09 Rev1 ^{C11}	Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution
5-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
5-00.2 Rev1	Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures

^{C7} Consolidation as JP 3-34 ^{C8} Incorporates JP 4-01.8

^{C9} Incorporates JPs 3-50.2, 3-50.21, and 3-50.3

^{C10} Incorporates JP 2-01.1 ^{C11} Consolidation as JP 4-09

^{C12} Consolidation as JP 4-02 ^{C13} Consolidation as JP 6-0

JOINT DOCTRINE POCs

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
JOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHY

KEYSTONE PUBLICATIONS

JTTP & DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

TPUBS

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DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION UPDATES

JOINT STAFF, J-7 JOINT EDUCATION AND DOCTRINE DIVISION (JEDD), JOINT DOCTRINE BRANCH (JDB)

By Colonel Jerry Lynes, USMC, Division Chief

PERSONNEL TURNOVER

The Joint Doctrine Branch (JDB) experienced the departure of some very key figures in the past months; making for a challenging transition. This transition has been coupled with a substantial increase in joint doctrine development and interest in doctrine within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Early this Summer we said farewell to the division chief, CAPT Bruce Russell, who retired after 30 years of service to the Navy. CAPT Russell has been succeeded by Col Jerry Lynes, USMC, an infantryman with recent experience in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM as a battalion commander. Colonel Gail Colvin, USAF, the JDB chief for the past two years, has moved on to take a group command at Holloman AFB, NM. Under her guidance joint doctrine has made great strides in streamlining the joint doctrine development process while making the process more visible to all involved. The new branch chief is Lt Col TJ Palmer, USAF, charged with helping to take joint doctrine development to new levels of efficiency while maintaining the authoritativeness the warfighter needs. We also said farewell to LTC Rucker Snead, USA, known to many as the "conscience" of the branch. Rucker championed homeland defense doctrine development and was instrumental in working with the doctrine community to resolve issues with numerous contentious publications paving the way to get the best guidance out to the warfighter.

The JDB welcomes several new members. LTC Bill Solms, USA, is joining us from the Army Staff. He is an aviator with considerable staff experience. LTC Larry Seman also joins us from the Army Staff and serves as our first National Guard member. Both of these soldiers bring a wealth of experience and a unique perspective from the Reserve Component. Additionally, Maj Mark "WX" Weatherington joins us fresh out of the USAF School for Advanced Airpower Studies. A B-1 aircraft commander and weapons school graduate, "WX" brings the school perspective plus the experience of recent operations in the

air over Southwest Asia. Mr. Jim McDonald, Col, USAF (Ret), joined the multinational team in February 2004 and has been working a number of multinational doctrine issues in addition to assisting with several joint publications. He is currently taking on the role of the Doctrine Functional Process Owner in the JS J-7's DOTMLPF review process. Col Tom Bradley, USAF, (Ret), is joining the multinational team to serve as Jim McDonald's replacement.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Joint Education and Doctrine Division. Joint Staff J-7 has reorganized its divisions this past summer, forming a new training division and a transformation division. Consequently, the former Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division (or JDETD) was renamed the Joint Education and Doctrine Division (or JEDD); home to the education and doctrine branches. There has been no change to the POCs or division responsibilities with respect to joint doctrine. The JEDD Division Chief, Col Lynes, will continue to lead the Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP).

JDD Distro List. Our JDD Distro system works well in keeping the Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) informed of doctrine taskers and information. However, in order to keep the address list current, we need all JDDC members to let us know when new folks arrive and others depart. Please notify JS J-7/JDB of any changes to the list.

The 34th JDWP and Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) Configuration Management Working Group is scheduled for 1-3 November 2004 at the JWFC in Suffolk, VA. The JDEIS Configuration Management Working Group will take place on 1 November 2004 followed by the JDWP on the 2nd.

DOCNET

Recently, in cooperation with a sponsoring university (American Public University System, <http://www.apus.edu>), JEDD was able to arrange for undergraduate college credit for successful completion of each DOCNET course. One credit hour is granted for each course. This is an optional feature, but for those interested in the benefit, the courses and credits are cost-free. Detailed information on the very simple process is available on the JEL Web site. Essentially, if an individual chooses to take advantage of this benefit, all the individual has to do is pass an online examination associated with a DOCNET course and submit the generated certificate of completion to the university.

DOCNET is a great resource for learning about joint doctrine. It also now provides a very attractive benefit to our Service members, or other DOD personnel who want to get free college credit hours while learning about the
(Organization updates continued on next page)

authoritative fundamental principles that guide the employment of our joint forces. For more information contact Lt Col TJ Palmer, USAF, Joint Staff J-7/JEDD, (703)692-6294.

JOINT AND ALLIED DOCTRINE DIVISION (JADD), FUTURES CENTER, HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)

By LTC Marsha Hansen, USA

Concept papers on the revision of FM 3-0, *Operations*, are being worked now. The writing team is in place at Fort Leavenworth, KS, and has established a working relationship with the JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, writing team. These publications will be developed in parallel and FM 3-0 will be published six months after JP 3-0 (scheduled for December 2005).

The camera-ready copies of **FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production***, and **FM 1-02, *Operational Terms***, are being prepared. Both are scheduled for publication in early Fall 2004. **FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency***, is being edited as the critical comments are worked. It also is scheduled for publication in early Fall 2004.

FMIs for the 3rd Infantry Division Modular Structure. Booze-Allen-Hamilton has the contract. The schedule calls for publication of six manuals in January 2005. The names provided below may change (and the numbers as well), but they likely are close to what will be published.

- FMI 3-90.6, *Heavy Brigade Combat Team Operations*.
- FMI 3-90.61, *Brigade Troops Battalion Operations*.
- FMI 3-xx.x, *Combined Arms Battalion Operations*.
- FMI 3-20.96, *Armed Reconnaissance Squadron*.
- FMI 3-09.22, *Heavy Brigade Combat Team Effects Operations*.
- FMI 3-xx.x, *Heavy Brigade Combat Team Sustainment Operations*.

HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE CENTER (HQ, AFDC/DJ)

By Maj Mark Brown, USAF, HQ AFDC/DJ

AFDC's joint integration directorate (DJ) has completed its move from Langley AFB, VA, to Maxwell AFB, AL. We now are collocated with the command section and the other three directorates of HQ, Air Force Doctrine Center. See the new "Joint Doctrine POCs" chart on page 21 for HQ, AFDC contact information. Our e-mail domain is now "*maxwell.af.mil*" instead of "*doctrine.af.mil*."

Several of the Langley team members have moved on to bigger and better things. Lt Col Phil Sever moved to the Air Expeditionary Force Center at Langley. Lt Col Leslie Ann returned to her career field in the medical group at Langley. Maj Kathleen Stancik stayed at Langley also, working at the Air Force C2ISR Center. Maj Tom Quick is assigned to the Headquarters, Air Combat Command personnel directorate. And our editor, Bea Waggener, now works for the ALSA Center aboard Langley.

AFDC/DJ picked up two very experienced Air Force doctrine writers in the move to Maxwell. Mr. Brian "Bingo" McLean joins our team with over seven years of doctrine experience and has taken the Air Force lead on JPs 1, 0-2, 3-0, and 6-0, among others. Mr. Jim Cresta has more than five years' doctrine experience, both in and out of uniform. He's responsible for Air Force inputs to several publications, including JPs 1-02, 3-11, and 4-02. Jim also serves as the Air Force terminologist.

Maj Bret "Shooter" Warren (one year) and I (two months) are both new action officers in DJ. Shooter is an intelligence officer who covers all our intelligence, information operations, and targeting JPs. I have a mobility background (airlift and tankers) and will be working mobility/logistics publications and a few others.

There is only one status check on an active JP for which the Air Force is the lead agent. JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*, is currently undergoing a formal assessment by USJFCOM JWFC. The Air Force likely will begin working on the revision program directive in early 2005.

TERMINOLOGY CURRENCY

Users of JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, should note that printed versions quickly become dated and they should go online to get the most current information. Navigate to: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (NWDC)

By Mr. Mike Bulawka, Joint Doctrine Analyst

Draft **JP 3-08**, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Final Coordination [FC]), has been delivered to the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS). The JSDS (with assistance from NWDC) will host a joint working group, tentatively scheduled for early this fall, to adjudicate comments on the FC version.

Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), the primary review authority for **JP 3-32**, *Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations*, has requested permission to develop another second draft rather than proceeding to FC. This decision was based on developments from a late 2003 joint force maritime component commander wargame, lessons learned from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, and comments received on the original second draft. It was felt that the nature and volume of changes would be so significant that the best recourse was simply to redo the second draft. To accommodate this request, CFFC also has proposed an adjustment to the development timelines. If approved, the Joint Doctrine Development Community would receive the new second draft of JP 3-32 in January 2005 and the FC version in May 2005. The new target date for approval would be September 2005.

In addition to the continued posting of Navy Warfare Publications on the NWDC SIPRNET site (<http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil.aspx>) and the Navy Knowledge On-line portal, the latest NWEL CD-ROM should be ready for distribution by the time this newsletter is published.

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (MCCDC), DOCTRINE DIVISION, JOINT DOCTRINE BRANCH

By Maj Tim Flanagan, USMC

Comments on JPs 3-02.1, *JTTP for Landing Force Operations* (Revision Final Coordination [RFC]), and 3-02.2, *JTTP for Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation* (RFC), were submitted to the Joint Staff during February 2004. Upon successful adjudication of all RFC comments, and in accordance with the Joint Doctrine Publication Consolidation Plan, these JPs will transition to and be published as approved multi-Service publications with the Marine Corps as the lead Service.

JWFC DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine and Education Group has taken the initiative in exploring the impact of emerging joint concepts on joint doctrine and developing recommendations for their incorporation. The following "JWFC Pamphlets" (available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> under "Other Publications") are designed to raise awareness, promote debate, and discuss the implications of emerging, concept-based ideas on joint doctrine.

- JWFC Pam 1, *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations*, discusses transformation and joint doctrine, rapid decisive operations concept, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002, and links concepts and doctrine.
- JWFC Pam 2, *Doctrinal Implications of Low Collateral Damage Capabilities*, addresses the ways and means and operational and doctrinal implications of these capabilities.
- JWFC Pam 3, *Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)*, discusses the SJFHQ organization and employment, enabling concepts (e.g., collaborative information environment, operational net assessment, joint interagency coordination group, effects-based planning, and focused logistics), and its implications for joint operation planning.
- JWFC Pam 4, *Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA)*, describes the ONA concept, its relationship to other concepts (e.g., SJFHQ), and its potential impact on joint intelligence, planning, and targeting processes.
- JWFC Pam 5, *Operational Implications of the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)*, addresses the value of collaboration; implementing CIE; and its implications to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and personnel and facilities.
- JWFC Pam 6, *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*, discusses the JIACG organization and concept of employment, related concepts (e.g., SJFHQ), and the impact of adopting the JIACG in several joint publications.
- JWFC Pam 7, *Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, is in development and expected to be published about the time this newsletter is published. It will explore the full potentialities in fielding an EBO capability.

The revision process for JP 3-07.5, *JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, is underway. Preliminary Coordination of the program directive was initiated in February 2004.

JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*, was approved on 16 September 2002 and revised JP 3-09.3, *JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)*, was approved on 3 September 2003. Both are available in the CJCS Joint Electronic Library (JEL) at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>.

(Organization updates continued on next page)

AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION (ALSA) CENTER

By Col David Petersen, USAF, Director

The ALSA Center continues to publish multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) to "meet the immediate needs of the warfighter." The publishing effort continues albeit with many new faces. Seven of ALSA's 14 action officers left this summer, with replacements continuing to arrive. Recently completed MTTP include *Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses/Anti-radiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment*, *HAVE QUICK*, *Joint Air Operations Center and Army Air and Missile Defense Command Coordination*, *Air Defense of the United States*, and *Time Sensitive Targets*.

Ongoing efforts at the ALSA Center include the development of MTTP on *Joint Fires*, *Detainee Operations*, *Kill Box Procedures*, *UHF/TACSAT Radios*, and the *Integrated Air Defense System*. Recently

begun or new projects include the development of MTTP on *Convoy Operations*—the first joint working group (JWG) was held from 5-8 October 2004. The first JWG for *Aviation Urban Operations* is scheduled for 19-22 October 2004 and the 2nd JWG from 16-19 November 2004. The JWG for *Brevity* is scheduled from 4-6 January 2005. The *Convoy Operations* and *Aviation Urban Operations* JWGs will either be at ALSA, or nearby, due to scheduled Hurricane Isabel repairs. The *Brevity* JWG will be held at Nellis AFB, NV.

We are constantly on the lookout for more ways to support the warfighter. We have a project being researched, six of our publications are being assessed for transition, two are being prepared to transition to Service leads, and two others are being assessed for rescission after transfer to other media. For more information on any of the MTTP mentioned previously, to suggest an MTTP for development, or just to find out more about this truly unique organization (focused on support to the warfighter); visit our new Web site at <http://www.alsa.mil> or contact us at alsadirector@langley.af.mil.

ALSA PROJECTS UPDATE CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION
ADUS: <i>MTTP for AIR DEFENSE of the United States</i> Classified SECRET/RELCAN	22 MAR 04	A: FM 3-01.1 N: NTTP 3-26.1.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.50	This MTTP supports planners, warfighters, and interagency personnel participating in air defense of the US by providing planning, coordination, and execution information. Pub is primarily focused at the tactical level. Includes Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Clear Skies Exercise lessons learned. Assess: 1 Sep 05 (18mo); 1 Mar 07 (3yr) POC: Team E alsae@langley.af.mil
AMCI: <i>Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations</i>	21 NOV 01 (Transitions to the Army in NOV 04)	FM 3-31.1 (FM 90-31) MCWP 3-36	Describes the capabilities and limitations of selected Army and Marine Corps organizations and provides TTP for the integrated employment of these units in joint operations. The example used is C2 of a notional Army Brigade by a MEF or C2 of a MEB by an Army Corps. Current Status: Scheduled for revision in November 2004 (3yr). (New POC is CAC/CADD, Ft. Leavenworth) ALSA transition POC: Team F alsaf@langley.af.mil
ARM-J: <i>Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment</i> Classified SECRET	JUL 02		This publication has been incorporated into the JSEAD publication.
AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS: <i>Multi-Service Procedures For Aviation Urban Operations</i>	15 APR 01	FM 3-06.1 (FM 1-130) MCRP 3-35.3A NTTP 3-01.04 AFTTP(I) 3-2.29	MTTP for the tactical-level planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations. Current Status: Program Approval (revision), 1 st JWG planned for 19-22 Oct 04. 2 nd JWG planned for 16-19 Nov 04. POC: Team E alsae@langley.af.mil
BREVITY: <i>Multi-Service Brevity Codes</i> Distribution Restricted	05 JUN 03 (Under Revision)	FM 3-54.10 (FM 3-97.18) MCRP 3-25B NTTP 6-02.1 AFTTP(I) 3-2.5	A dictionary of multi-Service use brevity codes to augment JP 1-02, <i>DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</i> . This pub standardizes air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface brevity code words in multi-Service operations. Current Status: Active: JWG scheduled 4-6 Jan 05, Nellis AFB POC: Team F alsaf@langley.af.mil
COMCAM: <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations</i>	15 MAR 03	FM 3-55.12 MCRP 3-33.7A NTTP 3-13.12 AFTTP(I) 3-2.41	This publication fills the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine, and assists JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool. Assess: 1 Sep 04 (18mo); 1 Mar 06 (3yr) POC: Team C alsac@langley.af.mil

ALSA PROJECTS UPDATE

CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS (Cont.)

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION
EOD: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment</i>	15 FEB 01	FM 4-30.16 MCRP 3-17.2C NTTP 3-02.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.32	Provides guidance and procedures for the employment of a joint explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) force. The manual assists commanders and planners in understanding the EOD capabilities of each Service. Current Status: Awaiting EOD transformation study results. POC: Team B alsab@langley.af.mil
HAVE QUICK	MAY 04	A: FM 6-02.771 M: MCRP 3-40.3F N: NTTP 6-02.7 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.49	Will simplify planning and coordination of HAVE QUICK radio procedures and responds to the lack of HAVE QUICK TTP throughout the Services. Additionally, it provides operators information on multi-Service HAVE QUICK communication systems while conducting home station training or in preparation for interoperability training. Assess: 1 Nov 05 (18 mo); 1 May 07 (3yr) POC: Team C alsac@langley.af.mil
HF-ALE: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment (HF-ALE) Radios</i>	01 SEP 03	FM 6-02.74 MCRP 3-40.3E NTTP 6-02.6 AFTTP(I) 3-2.48	Standardizes high power and low power HF-ALE operations across the Services and enable joint forces to use HF radio as a supplement / alternative to overburdened SATCOM systems for over-the-horizon communications. Assess: 1 Mar 05 (18mo); 1 Sep 06 (3yr) POC: Team C alsac@langley.af.mil
ICAC2: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control</i>	30 JUN 00 (Will be reassessed upon publication of JP 3-52)	FM 3-52.1 (FM 100-103-1) MCRP 3-25D NTTP 3-52.1(Rev A) AFTTP(I) 3-2.16	Provides detailed TTP for airspace C2 to include specialized missions not covered in JP 3-52, <i>Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone</i> . Includes specific information on interfaces and communications required to support integrated airspace control in a multi-Service environment. Current Status: Attempting to incorporate information into JP 3-52. Pub will be retained until it is determined information is accepted. POC: Team D alsad@langley.af.mil
IADS: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for a Joint Integrated Air Defense System</i> Distribution Restricted	08 JUN 01 (Under Revision)	FM 3-01.15 MCRP 3-25E NTTP 3-01.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2.31	This publication provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures, to include integration procedures. The revision will be re-titled to "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)." Current status: Command Approval POC: Team D alsad@langley.af.mil
IDM: <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Improved Data Modem Integration</i> Distribution Restricted	30 MAY 03	FM 6-02.76 MCRP 3-25G NTTP 6-02.3 AFTTP(I) 3-2.38	Provides digital connectivity to a variety of attack and reconnaissance aircraft; facilitates exchange of near-real-time targeting data and improves tactical situational awareness by providing a concise picture of the multi-dimensional battlefield. Assess: 1 Nov 04 (18mo); 1 May 06 (3yr) POC: Team C alsac@langley.af.mil
IFF: <i>MTTP for Mk XII IFF Mode 4 Security Issues in a Joint Integrated Air Defense System</i> Classified SECRET	11 DEC 03	FM 3-01.61 MCWP 3-25.11 NTTP 6-02.4 AFTTP(I) 3-2.39	The publication educates the warfighter to security issues associated with using the Mark XII IFF Mode 4 Combat Identification System in a joint integrated air defense environment. It captures TTP used today by the warfighter that can address those security issues. Current Status: Assess: 1 Jun 05 (18mo); 1 Dec 06 (3yr) POC: Team A alsaa@langley.af.mil
JAAT: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations</i> Distribution Restricted	03 JUN 98		This publication has been incorporated into the JFIRE publication.
JAOC / AAMDC: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Operations Center and Army Air and Missile Defense Command Coordination</i> Distribution Restricted	22 Mar 04	FM 3-01.20 AFTTP(I) 3-2.30	Addresses coordination requirements between the Joint Air Operations Center and the Army Air and Missile Defense Command. Assists the JFC, JFACC, and their staffs in developing a coherent approach to planning and execution of AMD operations. Assess: 1 Sep 05 (18mo); 1 Mar 07 (3yr) POC: Team D alsad@langley.af.mil
JATC: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</i>	17 JUL 03	FM 3-52.3 (FM 100-104) MCRP 3-25A NTTP 3-56.3 AFTTP(I) 3-2.23	Ready reference source for guidance on ATC responsibilities, procedures, and employment in a joint environment. Discusses JATC employment and Service relationships for initial, transition, and sustained ATC operations across the spectrum of joint operations within the theater or area of responsibility (AOR). Assess: 1 Jan 05 (18mo); 1 Jul 06 (3yr) POC: Team F alsaf@langley.af.mil

(Organization updates continued on next page)

ALSA PROJECTS UPDATE
CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS (Cont.)

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION
J-FIRE: Multi-Service Procedures for <i>Joint Application of Firepower</i> Distribution Restricted	01 NOV 02 (Under Revision)	FM 3-09.32 (FM 90-20) MCRP 3-16.6A NTTP 3-09.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.6	A pocket-size guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. Provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations. Current Status: Command Approval POC: Team A alsaa@langley.af.mil
JSEAD/ARM-J: <i>Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses</i> Classified SECRET	28 May 04	FM 3-01.4 MCRP 3-22.2A NTTP 3-01.42 AFTTP(I) 3-2.28	This publication fills a planning and employment void not captured in existing Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures. It contributes to Service interoperability by providing the JTF and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators a single, consolidated reference. Additionally, this publication discusses the employment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, electronic and destructive attack weapons systems to destroy/disrupt/degrade the enemy's air defenses. It also incorporates appropriate anti-radiation missile information. Assess: Nov 05 (18 mo); May 07 (3yr) POC: Team A alsaa@langley.af.mil
JSTARS: <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</i> Distribution Restricted	17 MAR 03	FM 3-55.6 (FM 90-37) MCRP 2-1E NTTP 3-55.13 (Rev A) AFTTP(I) 3-2.2	This publication provides procedures for the employment of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) in dedicated support to the JFC. Revision will be unclassified. The unclassified revision describes multi-Service TTP for consideration and use during planning and employment of the JSTARS. Assess: 1 Sep 04 (18mo); 1 Mar 06 (3yr) POC: Team D alsad@langley.af.mil
JTF IM: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management</i> Distribution Restricted	10 SEP 03	FM 6-02.85 (FM 101-4) MCRP 3-40.2A NTTP 3-13.1.16 AFTTP(I) 3-2.22	This publication describes how to manage, control, and protect information in a JTF headquarters conducting continuous operations. Assess: 1 Mar 05 (18mo); 1 Sep 06 (3yr) POC: Team C alsac@langley.af.mil
JTF Liaison Officer Integration: <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration</i>	27 JAN 03	FM 5-01.12 (FM 90-41) MCRP 5-1.B NTTP 5-02 AFTTP(I) 3-2.21	This publication defines liaison functions and responsibilities associated with operating a JTF. Awaiting results of 18 month transition assessment – looking to incorporate contents into JP 5-00.2. Assess: 15 Jul 04 (18mo); 27 Jan 06 (3yr) POC: Team B alsab@langley.af.mil
JTMTD: <i>Multi-Service Procedures Joint Theater Missile Target Development</i> Distribution Restricted	11 Nov 03	FM 3-01.51 (FM 90-43) NTTP 3-01.13 AFTTP(I) 3-2.24	The JTMTD publication documents TTPs for threat missile target development in early entry and mature theater operations. It provides a common understanding of the threat missile target set and information on the component elements involved in target development and attack operations. Assess: 1 May 05 (18mo); 1 Nov 06 (3yr) POC: Team D alsad@langley.af.mil
NLW: <i>Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons</i>	15 JAN 03	FM 3-22.40 (FM 90-40) MCWP 3-15.8 NTTP 3-07.3.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.45 USCG Pub 3-07.31	This publication supplements established doctrine and TTP and provides a source of reference material to assist commanders and staffs in planning/coordinating tactical operations. It incorporates the latest lessons learned from real world and training operations, and examples of TTP from various sources. Assess: 15 Jul 04 (18mo); 15 Jan 06 (3yr) POC: Team B alsab@langley.af.mil
PEACE OPS: <i>MTTP for Peace Operations</i>	26 OCT 03	FM 3-07.31 MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2.40	This publication provides tactical level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations. Assess: 1 Apr 05 (18mo); 1 Oct 06 (3yr) POC: Team E alsae@langley.af.mil
REPROGRAMMING: <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing</i> Distribution Restricted	06 JAN 03	FM 3-51.1 (FM 34-72) MCRP 3-40.5B NTTP 3-13.1.15 AFTTP(I) 3-2.7	This publication supports the JTF staff in the planning, coordinating, and executing of reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations. Assess: 15 Jul 04 (18mo); 06 Jan 06 (3yr) POC: Team G alsag@langley.af.mil
RM: <i>Risk Management</i>	15 FEB 01	FM 3-100.12 (FM 5-19.1) MCRP 5-12.1C NTTP 5-03.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.34	Provides a consolidated multi-Service reference, addressing risk management background, principles, and application procedures. To facilitate multi-Service interoperability, it identifies and explains the risk management process and its differences and similarities as it is applied by each Service. Assessment complete, recommended to retain, will be reassessed Oct 05 (18 mo); 15 Feb 07 POC: Team G alsag@langley.af.mil

ALSA PROJECTS UPDATE

CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS (Cont.)

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION
SURVIVAL: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</i> Distribution Restricted	19 MAR 03	FM 3-50.3 (FM 21-76-1) MCRP 3-02H NTTP 3-50.3 AFTTP(I) 3-2.26	This publication provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. Assess: 15 Jul 04 (18mo); 1 Mar 06 (3yr) POC: Team B alsab@langley.af.mil
TADIL-J: <i>Introduction to Tactical Digital Information Link J and Quick Reference Guide</i>	30 JUN 00 (Incorporating with FORSCOM JTAO Handbook)	FM 6-24.8 (FM 6-02.241) MCRP 3-25C NTTP 6-02.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.27	Provides a guide for warfighters with limited or no experience or background in TADIL J and needing a quick orientation for supplemental or in-depth information. TADIL J is also known in NATO as Link 16. Current Status: The information in this publication will be incorporated into the FORSCOM Joint Tactical Air Operations Procedural Handbook. POC: Team C alsac@langley.af.mil
TAGS: <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air Ground System</i>	8 DEC 03	FM 3-52.2 (FM 100-103-2) MCRP 3-25F NTTP 3-56.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.17	This publication promotes inter-Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC's campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for the conduct of air-ground operations. Assess: 1 Jun 05 (18mo); 1 Dec 06 (3yr) POC: Team D alsad@langley.af.mil
TACTICAL RADIOS: <i>Multi-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment</i>	14 JUN 02	FM 6-02.72 (FM 11-1) MCRP 3-40.3A NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.18	Standardizes joint operational procedures for Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) and provides and overview of the multi-Service applications of Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLARS). Assess: 1 Jun 05 (3yr) POC: Team C alsac@langley.af.mil
TMD IPB: <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</i>	04 MAR 02 (Transitioned to the Army in SEP 04)	FM 3-01.16 MCRP 2-12.1A NTTP 2.01.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.36	This publication provides a systematic and common methodology for analyzing the theater adversary missile force in its operating environment. Current Status: Scheduled for revision in March 2005 (3yr). (New POC is CAC/CADD, Ft. Leavenworth) POC: Team G alsag@langley.af.mil
TST: <i>MTTP for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets</i> Distribution Restricted	20 APR 04	A: FM 3-60.1 M: 3-16D N: NTTP 3-60.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.3	This publication provides the JFC, the JFC's operational staff, and components unclassified MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute TSTs within any AOR. Includes OIF and OEF lessons learned, multinational and other government agency considerations. Appendix D (COMUSCENTAF Counter-SCUD CONOPS and Playbook – Secret Rel GBR/AUS), Appendix F (TST collaboration tools) and Appendix G (CGRS) available via electronic means only. Assess: Oct 05 (18mo); Apr 07 (3yr) POC: Team F alsaf@langley.af.mil
UXO: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance Operations (UXO)</i>	23 AUG 01	FM 3-100.38 MCRP 3-17.2B NTTP 3-02.4.1 AFTTP(I) 3-2.12	This publication describes hazards of unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) sub-munitions to land operations, addresses UXO planning considerations, and describes the architecture for reporting and tracking UXO during combat and post conflict. Revision scheduled for 2004. Assess: 1 Oct 04 (3yr) POC: Team B alsab@langley.af.mil

MONITORED PROJECTS

These are potential projects of interest, researched by ALSA, but not mature enough to move forward with an MTTP. This also includes projects that have a direct influence on current ALSA publications.

TITLE	DESCRIPTION
IW/IO Information Warfare/Information Operations	JASC task for an ALSA Study to support a TRADOC IO Concept Based Requirement System assessment. Purpose was to present an unbiased, objective perspective of issues in IW/IO doctrine. Study completed in Dec 95. Results identified a lack of specific guidance for the full range of military involvement in IW/IO. JP 3-13 was published in Oct 98. It is currently in FAST TRACK revision (Since 1995). POC: Team G alsag@langley.af.mil
GPS Vulnerability and Mitigation	U.S. Forces, weapons systems, and C4ISR systems are increasingly dependent on Global Positioning System (GPS) data for vital information. These systems are subject to denial, degradation, or deception from intentional adversary actions or inadvertent electromagnetic interference (EMI) (Since 1998). POC: Team A alsaa@langley.af.mil
Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS)	•CGRS is described in Appendix G of the TST MTTP. ALSA hosted a CGRS conference in March 2004, which concluded that a single CGRS standard for the Joint force and Combatant Commanders is highly desirable. ALSA is working with JFCOM and the services to support a CGRS standardization effort (Since April 2004). POC: Team F alsaf@langley.af.mil
Joint Close Air Support (J-CAS)	Continue to monitor for 9 line issues and ongoing functions of JCAS ESC to incorporate pertinent information into applicable ALSA pubs i.e., J-Fire (Since 1998). POC Team A alsaa@langley.af.mil

(Organization updates continued on next page)

MONITORED PROJECTS (Cont.)

These are potential projects of interest, researched by ALSA, but not mature enough to move forward with an MTTP. This also includes projects that have a direct influence on current ALSA publications.

TITLE	DESCRIPTION
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)	JUAV JT&E chartered in Oct '01 to address lack of Joint Doctrine for UAVs in time sensitive operations and targeting. Final Test Report due Apr '05. ALSA monitors for possible MTTP development (Since 1998). POC: TEAM C alsac@langley.af.mil
TF Modularity	At the June 2004 GO/FO VTC MG Mixon USA JASC member requested ALSA be involved in monitoring the work of the Army's Task Force Modularity. The JASC members supported as long as this does not overload ALSA from its primary efforts with MTTP. Operational Assessment 13-24 Sep 04 at Fort Leavenworth (Since 2004). POCs: TEAM D, TEAM G alsad@langley.af.mil; alsag@langley.af.mil
Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA)	No BDA structure/TTP exists. Mobile target processes is a primary TTP shortcoming. Validation occurs during UFL 03 this summer: report due out in Nov 03. Final JBDA report is due Dec 04. (Since 2003) POC: TEAM G alsag@langley.af.mil
SOF Interoperability	Lessons learned from OEF and OIF highlight a need to improve SOF-conventional force integration during planning and execution, particularly in maneuver and fire support coordination (Since 2003). POC: TEAM B alsab@langley.af.mil
Convoy Operations	Generated from the Nov 03 JASC. ALSA was tasked to investigate the JSURV's work into convoy operations and determine if ALSA could help in anyway. ALSA prepared a research paper in Dec 03 that determined the JSURV efforts were too advanced for ALSA to be of much help. ALSA monitored until May 04 to determine the effectiveness of the JSURV convoy ops handbook and whether or not an MTTP would be beneficial at that time. POC: TEAM E alsae@langley.af.mil
NATO Brevity	NATO Brevity Words (APP-7), Allied Brevity Words (ACP-165), and US Brevity Codes do not match in many instances, causing high potential for confusion in coalition operations. ALSA is working with the Services, NATO and the Joint Staff to resolve Brevity discrepancies (Since 2003). POC: TEAM F alsaf@langley.af.mil
JALO Joint Airhead Lodgment Operations	As a result of hotwash from Airbase Opening conference at Scott AFB 19-22 May 03, Air Mobility Command asked ALSA to develop an MTTP to address perceived seams in Joint and Service doctrine dealing with airfield seizure and use of airfields for sustainment of forces. This topic was also discussed at 2003 USA/USAF Warfighter talks. ALSA PAP disapproved in Jul 04 by USMC and USA JASC members. ALSA will monitor revisions to Joint Pubs (3-10, 3-17, 3-18) for doctrinal fixes (Since 2004). POC: TEAM E alsae@langley.af.mil

NEW ALSA PROJECTS

TITLE	EST PUB DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION AND STATUS
DETAINEE OPERATIONS <i>MTTP for Detainee Operations in a Joint Environment</i> Distribution Restricted	NOV 04	A: FM 3-19.401 M: MCRP 4-11.8D N: NTTP 3-07.8 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.51	MTTP regarding detainee operations (unprivileged belligerents) to include transporting, transferring and holding of the high-risk detainees. Current Status: On hold awaiting DOD approval for release and service chaplain/legal reviews. POC: TEAM B alsab@langley.af.mil
UHF TACSAT/DAMA Frequency Management	TBD	A: FM 6-02.90 M: MCRP 3-40.3G N: NTTP 6-02.9 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.53	Recent operations at JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing limited number of UHF TACSAT frequencies. TTP documented in this publication will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. Current Status: Command Approval POC: TEAM C alsac@langley.af.mil
Interpreter Ops	TBD	Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 04-7	Team B will monitor this project for 18 months following the release of the handbook and then decide whether to develop as an MTTP or remove it as a monitored project. Current Status: Complete. Available electronically and will be printed as a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook. POC: TEAM B alsab@langley.af.mil
Kill Box <i>MTTP for Kill Box Operations</i>	APR 05	N: NTTP 3-09.2.1	This MTTP assists the Services and Joint Force Commanders in developing, establishing, and executing Kill Box procedures to allow rapid target engagement. This MTTP describes timely, effective multi-service solutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measures with respect to Kill Box operations. Current Status: Program Development 2nd Joint working group held 24 Aug 04-27 Aug 04. POC: TEAM B alsab@langley.af.mil
Convoy Operations	JAN 05	TBD	This MTTP consolidates the Services' best tactics, techniques, and procedures used in convoy operations into a single multi-service TTP with the objective of reducing casualty rates and increasing the probability of mission success during convoy operations. This MTTP focuses on combat support and combat service support forces and provides a quick reference guide for convoy commanders and subordinates on how to plan, train, and conduct tactical convoy operations in the contemporary operating environment. Current Status: FAST TRACK, Program Development, Joint Working Group planned for 5-8 Oct 04. POC: TEAM E alsae@langley.af.mil
Mountain Operations	OCT 05	TBD	Current Status: Phase I, Research. ALSA is determining whether MTTP is warranted for interoperability gaps in Joint mountain/cold weather operations. POC: TEAM A alsaa@langley.af.mil

PRINCIPLES OF WAR FOR THE 21ST CENTURY INFORMATION AGE—LET THE DEBATE BEGIN

By Messrs. Scott Ensminger, Mike Seitz, and Bob Fawcett, USJFCOM J9, Joint Operations Concepts Team

The authors believe that the conduct of war has changed and that it is time to review the much venerated fifty year old principles of war. They propose a revised set of principles for consideration.

INTRODUCTION

Principles of warfare have been taught and discussed at various military institutions since the late 19th century. Those principles evolved over time. Since the middle of the 20th Century our current set of principles has been codified in doctrine and has served to guide our approach to warfare.¹ But war is not what it used to be. While the nature of war remains unchanged—a violent clash of human wills fueled by emotions and marked by uncertainty, fog, and friction—changes in technology, the global environment, society, and our adversaries in the latter part of the 20th Century have significantly changed the conduct of war. As we enter the 21st Century, the conduct of war has continued to evolve; the principles of war have not.

Our adversaries are no longer solely nation states with conventional militaries, but also failing nation states and loosely linked transnationals not necessarily under the control of a national government. The proliferation of technology and lethal weapons greatly empower these adversaries, whether nations, groups, or individuals. At the same time the distinctions between war and operations other than war, each with a codified set of principles, is becoming more blurred.² Success in winning both the war and the peace requires greater integration of the diplomatic, economic, and information instruments of national power. **Military force alone seldom wins both the war and the peace.**

It is important to have a single set of principles—based on war as it is, not as it was—that serves as the basis for the training and education of our warrior leaders and upon which we base our conduct of war across the range of military operations. All of this requires the current Principles of War to be reviewed, discussed, and revised to reflect the new realities of networked information age warfare in the 21st Century.

PURPOSE

Professional discussion and review of the literature confirm that opinions about the principles of war abound; they vary greatly; and all are strongly held. The purpose of this essay is to enter the debate and foster the discussion by providing a revised set of principles for consideration. The principles serve as guides, based on historical successes, to suggest thoughts and actions, tempered by experience, which might lead to more effectively conducting operations. These guiding principles often frame a dialectic³ argument between two or more seemingly conflicting ideas. For example, maneuver may adversely impact surprise, measures taken to enhance security may impact adversely on legitimacy; and desire for simplicity may seem at odds with a clear understanding of intent in a complex environment. Application of the principles requires balancing these potentially conflicting ideas and then selecting where, when, and how to apply the available force capabilities within the context of the appropriate interrelated principles.

The following presents our modified list of principles and their tenets, along with a short explanation of the reasons for the changes. Three principles have been added (i.e., *Understanding*, *Endurance*, and *Legitimacy*). Several principles have their tenets modified to emphasize certain elements (i.e., *Unity of Command*, *Mass*, *Offensive*, *Maneuver*, and *Simplicity*). Others remain basically unchanged (i.e., *Objective*, *Surprise*, *Economy of Force*, and *Security*).

THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLES OF WAR

UNDERSTANDING

Understanding—to know more about the adversary, the operational environment, and ourselves, in order to more precisely and effectively apply our capabilities to produce desired effects at the least costs.

We must aggressively pursue and even fight for information that leads to knowledge and understanding.

Better, shared knowledge among the force enables the coherent use of all the available capabilities, the exploitation of opportunities, and better harmonization of all instruments of national and multinational power.

PROPOSED PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Understanding
Unity of Effort
Distribution of Force
Endurance
Initiative
Legitimacy
Maneuver
Simplicity
Objective
Surprise
Economy of Force
Security

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Experimentation and lessons learned from modern conflicts have driven home the need for our first "new" principle, *Understanding*. This principle acknowledges the centrality of information, knowledge, and understanding to success in modern war. It is understanding that allows us to determine the correct objectives. It is understanding that guides the distribution of our force. Understanding is the new foundation of our list. Given its importance, its absence from previous lists is intriguing. Its absence from our modern list would be conspicuous.

UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of Effort—to focus all actions toward the desired end states⁴ and objectives in support of the strategic aim.

Unity of Effort is a result of unity of purpose that leads to coherency of action, which is the integrated and complementary execution of the actions of all the partners in an operation or campaign, by means of either command or cooperation.

The integration of the required capabilities into an interdependent joint force requires a clear, shared understanding of all the objectives and desired effects combined with the coherency of action best provided by the guidance of one commander or leader.

Unity of Command is changed to *Unity of Effort*. Our approach to war must be one that integrates all instruments of power, extending well beyond those elements strictly under a traditional hierarchical military command. Unity of effort, whether through command or cooperation, must be sought in order to maximize the synergy of the disparate elements of the force, including other government, coalition, and even nongovernmental organizations.⁵

The phrase "under one commander or leader" acknowledges that in certain operations, the military force may assume a supporting role, with the military commander potentially answerable to a nonmilitary leader, such as an ambassador or coalition authority.

A corollary of this principle is the idea of *integration* to maximize the effectiveness of the forces being employed by combining all appropriate means in a coherent effort. Integrated action allows us to engage an adversary through multiple means or dimensions in such a way as to ensure that whatever means they employ to mitigate one threat leaves them more vulnerable to another.⁶

A strict, hierarchical command authority will not always be possible with some nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations. However, being able to coherently use the various capabilities inherent in all instruments of power is required for unity of effort.

DISTRIBUTION OF FORCE

Distribution of Force—to allocate, distribute, and apply combat power, from multiple sources, directions, and dimensions, at the most advantageous places and times throughout the battlespace to achieve desired objectives.

The distribution of force involves balancing the concentration of combat power to achieve overmatch at a critical points with its distribution across the battlespace to maintain continuous pressure as necessary against the adversary's other dispersed decisive points.

Pressure must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects at critical points, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

Distribution of Force replaces the old principle of *Mass*. The origin of mass as a principle was based on the need for armies to mass their formations and associated firepower upon an enemy formation. The meaning later changed to incorporate the massing of effects. Both meanings imply a concentration of force upon the enemy at a single time and place—at a center of gravity, decisive or critical point. As important as applying sufficient force at any point is, the distribution of the necessary force over several dispersed decisive points is even more important.

The emergence of a complex, adaptive enemy, who may choose to avoid a decisive military confrontation, operating in a distributed battlespace, has greatly reduced the relevance of mass as a principle of war. Against this kind of adversary, massed formation warfare, or even massed effects at a single decisive point, may not be effective. Distributed, overmatching⁷ force concentrated at several "decisive points" is a more appropriate principle.

ENDURANCE

Endurance—to overmatch the adversary in both the will to pay the costs and the ability to sustain the forces that are required to achieve a decisive, lasting conclusion to the war.

Endurance has both a mental and physical aspect. The mental aspect can be expressed as will, while the physical aspect can be expressed as sustainment of overmatching forces. Both are necessary in order to endure the costs of achieving a decisive, lasting victory.

Since endurance consists of both will and the physical aspects of power, then removing either the will or physical capabilities from one side in a conflict will likely lead to victory for the other side.

A new principle of *Endurance* is added. Related to the old military operations other than war (MOOTW) principle of *perseverance*; endurance reminds us that

decisive, lasting conclusions to wars are seldom achieved quickly or cheaply. They require the resolute, enduring commitment of national resources, always at some cost in lives and assets. This requires both willingness and ability to endure the costs for as long as it takes until victory is achieved. Adversaries may wage a global war of exhaustion that requires extraordinary endurance.

Endurance has both a mental and a physical aspect. The mental aspect can be expressed as the *will* to see the conflict through to a decisive, lasting conclusion. Will is applicable at the strategic level, where it has a heavy political and social context, as well as at the operational and tactical levels of military operations. Defeating an adversary's will to fight, although difficult, is the surest method of ending a conflict on favorable terms. Most battles and engagements are won when the soldier or unit decides it will be beaten, not when it is physically destroyed; however, destruction of physical capability does contribute to breaking will and in the end may be required if will cannot be broken.

The physical aspect of endurance involves having the necessary people, equipment, and other resources to sustain the forces at the intensity and duration required for victory. Endurance is related to the principle of *Economy of Force*. The force must be strong enough to endure any action and still achieve overmatching power that enables achievement of the objectives throughout the global battlespace for as long as it takes.

INITIATIVE

Initiative—to seize, retain, and exploit opportunities to impose friendly will.⁸

Initiative requires military leaders at all levels to execute orders intelligently and ingeniously within the overarching context of the commander's intent to create and exploit opportunities to impose their will on adversaries.

Initiative is enhanced by speed—rapidity of the decision and action cycle. Deciding and acting faster than the adversary is the essence of initiative.

Leaders should take calculated risks and exploit the full leverage of all available capabilities to confuse, demoralize, and defeat their adversaries through seizing the initiative even when in a defensive posture.

The old principle of *Offensive* is replaced by the new principle *Initiative*. At the strategic level we "must replace the fascination of offensive with the complex realities of attaining political ends through the judicious application of military means."⁹ The revised principle focuses on a mindset that encourages leaders to seize, retain, and exploit opportunity—seizing the initiative. It is through the initiative, not just offensive action, which we seek to impose our will on the enemy.

Initiative in creating and exploiting opportunities will continue to be an American tradition, but initiative must transcend the simplistic notion that it is mainly about energetic officers attacking without orders. Initiative is about much more than the personality of the commander. Leaders must train, position, and employ their forces in a manner that allows them to anticipate and exploit opportunities when they occur.

LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy—to develop and maintain the will necessary to achieve strategic aims and military end state."

Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken as well as the will of our people to support the actions. Legitimacy also affects the willingness of other nations to support our cause.

All actions must consider legitimacy in the light of potentially competing strategic aims and tactical requirements, and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate.

The principle of *Legitimacy*, from MOOTW, is added as a new principle of war. In the interconnected world of the information age, legitimacy clearly applies to war as well as MOOTW. Long ago, Clausewitz wrote that war was not only the business of the military and the government, but of the people as well. Legitimacy, including the perceived morality of our actions, influences the will of our nation, of the population of the nations we are engaging, and perhaps that of the entire world. Nations seek legitimacy with at least some constituency—the UN, other regional nations, potential allies, and their own population (especially in a democracy). Even a terrorist or insurgent organization must convince some segment of a population of the legitimacy of its cause in order to gain recruits and other essential support. Since tactical actions may create strategic effects, the commander must consider the perceived legitimacy of such actions and their impact on the objectives. Draconian security measures may enhance security but might damage legitimacy.

MANEUVER

Maneuver—to shape the battlespace and set the conditions to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the integrated application of military power in order to dislocate or defeat the enemy.

Maneuver is the application of military and nonmilitary capabilities in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional, informational, cognitive, or moral advantage in any dimension or domain. Consideration must extend to both lethal and nonlethal capabilities and beyond organic capabilities to encompass all the capabilities of the joint force.

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Effective maneuver dislocates the enemy and puts us in a position to destroy or defeat him. It keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by allowing us to continuously adapt our maneuver to pose new problems for the enemy.

The principle of *Maneuver* is modified to emphasize that the advantage gained through maneuver resides not just in the physical, but also in the information and cognitive domains. The threatened delivery of direct or indirect fires in current doctrine is expanded to include lethal and nonlethal capabilities and specifically brings attention to capabilities beyond just those that are organic. In this framework, maneuver shapes the battlespace and also integrates joint force capabilities to gain an advantage. Maneuver encompasses the use of *Surprise* in areas where and when the enemy is unprepared.

SIMPLICITY

Simplicity—to facilitate understanding and execution of actions by providing clear, uncomplicated plans and orders.

Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion and contribute to shared understanding. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan that imparts clear understanding of objectives and intent is preferable.

Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitates mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of combat.

The principle of *Simplicity* still applies in its preference for simplicity of plans and orders to facilitate execution of actions. The addition of the phrase, "that imparts clear understanding of objectives and intent" acknowledges that in an inherently complex environment against an adaptive adversary, simplicity must be balanced with the need for sufficient detail to ensure a clear, full understanding of objectives and intent.

OBJECTIVE

Objective—to direct every military operation toward clearly defined, attainable objectives those most directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the overall strategic aims of the conflict.

A clear understanding of the objective helps bring coherence to simultaneous, distributed, and parallel operations and to the application of military and other instruments of national power.

The desired strategic aims may change over time as conditions change. As that occurs, the military objectives must be changed as well.

The word "decisive" from the current doctrinal description of objective is eliminated. Modern conflicts

have taught us that warfare involves not one, but multiple interrelated objectives. Some objectives are tangible, while others are intangible. The importance of objective as a means to bring coherence to an operation, which involves not only military actions, but nonmilitary actions as well, has been added.

SURPRISE

Surprise—to gain an advantage by striking at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is physically or mentally unprepared.

Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include delaying detection and hastening contact. These are enabled by speed in decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operational security; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

Commanders should seek out opportunities to dislocate the enemy by doing the unexpected, and especially by attacking asymmetrically against an adversary's vulnerabilities, maximizing the advantages to be gained.

Surprise is modified to include the idea that it is based on two dialectic elements, secrecy and speed. Secrecy and stealth delay detection; speed hastens contact. Either of these can leave the enemy too little time to be prepared, thus increasing our ability to cause mental or physical dislocation.

The description is expanded to include exploiting the enemy's unpreparedness through dislocation in the spatial, temporal, functional, or psychological realms. At some times and in some ways, every force has a vulnerable window of unpreparedness in one of the realms.¹⁰ Identifying those realms of unpreparedness, and exploiting them to advantage, is the essence of dislocation and surprise.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

Economy of Force—the judicious employment and distribution of forces.

Economy is the measured allocation of available combat power to necessary tasks in order to achieve objectives in the most effective and efficient manner. Economy uses knowledge to apply the minimum essential force to necessary but secondary efforts.

Economy insists that we orient on the identified objectives while avoiding needless expenditures that do not lead us to them. Economy also supports endurance by considering preservation of the force for future operations.

The idea of applying minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts is not wrong, just no longer the central idea. The tenets of *Economy Of Force* are modified to emphasize the finite nature of assets against the demands of potential global confrontation and the need for the careful allocation of combat power. Economy of force supports the successful execution of actions at multiple decisive points through overmatching force, instead of overwhelming force. As rewritten, this principle emphasizes the need to focus limited assets against essential objectives as well as the preservation of force for future operation.

The new principle of *Understanding* helps us economize by allowing us to more judiciously apply the right force at the right time and place while conserving power for necessary actions at other times or places.

SECURITY

Security—to preserve friendly combat power and enhance freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.

Security must extend from the homeland to the point of contact with the enemy.

Security results from an understanding of the situation, the adversary's intent, tactics, and capabilities as well as the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces.

Security involves prudent risk management that balances force protection actions against the need to maintain legitimacy and achieve the desired effects of the mission.

Security is retained as a principle but expanded to include protecting the homeland. It also addresses balancing force protection actions against maintaining legitimacy and achieving desired effects. Understanding of strategic aims, objectives, desired effects, potential adversary asymmetric approaches, and associated friendly vulnerabilities is especially crucial to achieving a balance between an acceptable level of protection and accomplishing the desired effects of the mission.

CONCLUSION

While the nature of war remains unchanged; technology, the environment, and our adversaries have changed significantly. Consequently, the conduct of war has changed. Operations other than war can no longer be treated as separate and distinct from operations of war. Principles must apply to the continuum of operations in war and other than war. The current principles and their antecedents focused more narrowly on the application of the military instrument of power. It is clearer to us now that military power cannot be applied in isolation. It must be applied in conjunction with other instruments of power to be effective. The old principles were designed for an

environment of nation state versus nation state conflict. That is only part of the threat we face today. **The principles of war are guides. If they are to be effective, they must be changed to reflect the current environment.**

Messrs. Scott Ensminger, Mike Seitz, and Bob Fawcett are contractors supporting the Joint Operations Concepts Team in the Joint Experimentation Directorate of USJFCOM. The opinions expressed are not to be construed as official positions. POC: CDR Joe Hinson, joseph.hinson@je.jfcom.mil.

ENDNOTES

¹ The current list of principles has been around since the 1949 version of the US Army FM 100-5, *Operations*. They are currently described in various Service publications. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 November 2000, Appendix B, "Principles of War," is our primary reference for this article.

² Action is underway to combine JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and JP 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*.

³ The *Encarta World English Dictionary* defines dialectic as the tension between two conflicting or interacting forces, elements or ideas. Operational art recognizes that tension exists between the extremes of two apparently conflicting ideas and attempts to strike an appropriate balance. Principles help frame that balancing, internal debate.

⁴ *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century*, Joint Staff, Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, approved by JROC memo 022-03, 28 January 2003, page 51.

⁵ Air Force Doctrine Document 1, *Basic Doctrine*, September 1997, p 13.

⁶ Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, *Warfighting*, 20 June 1997, p 94.

⁷ Overmatching force refers to the integrated application of a variety of lethal and nonlethal, symmetric and asymmetric means in such a manner as to overmatch an adversary at a given point. It contrasts with the idea of overwhelming force, which connotes the application of mostly symmetric physical force to defeat an adversary.

⁸ Adapted from *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century*, pp 47-48.

⁹ Leonhard, *Principles of War for the Information Age*, p 83.

¹⁰ Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver*, Novato: Presidio Press, 1991.



RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

The ROMO falls within the spectrum of conflict from peace to war (Figure 3). Elected officials control the military's activities along that spectrum. The ROMO is generally along a continuum that ranges from a military force in being, i.e., maintaining military capabilities, to large-scale, sustained combat operations, i.e., major combat operations. All military operations fall somewhere along this continuum from military training to theater security cooperation activities up to and including nuclear strikes. Factors that determine where an operation falls within this range are based on scale, level of effort, intensity, duration, purpose, and risk.

Military forces conducting various combat operations are easily placed in this ROMO. Military forces conducting operations supporting civilian authorities also operate on that continuum. For example, a joint task force conducting consequence management as a result of a terrorist use of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive weapon against a US city may be conducting a major operation based on scale and level of effort.

MAJOR FORMS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

The various types of military operations (offensive counterair, forcible entry, strikes, humanitarian assistance, etc.) can be generally be grouped into four major forms of operations based on purpose. These major forms of operations can be generally categorized as offense, defense, stability, and support. Stability operations (focused on foreign stability efforts) and support operations (focused on domestic support to civilian authorities) generally encompass those type missions that were associated with MOOTW. General descriptions of the four major forms of military operations follow.

- **Offensive operations** aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory.
- **Defensive operations** defeat enemy attacks, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Their purpose is to protect a friendly COG, decisive point, or capability and create conditions to regain the initiative through offensive action.
- **Stability operations** promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of developmental actions, cooperative activities, supporting diplomatic efforts, foreign humanitarian assistance, and limited coercive actions. Their purpose is to promote and sustain, local, regional, and global stability.
- **Support operations** are used to assist domestic civil authorities as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering when an emergency overtaxes their capabilities. Their purpose is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups for a limited time, until civil authorities can meet those needs without military assistance.

This is useful to the President, Secretary of Defense, joint force commanders (JFCs), and staffs as they visualize the conduct of joint operations to achieve national objectives. JFCs usually conduct these operations simultaneously to achieve desired results or objectives at any level along the ROMO. As a minimum, commanders will think about the need to conduct all four simultaneously and level of effort on each major form. Examples are attacking enemy decisive points or a center of gravity (offensive); protecting friendly decisive points or a center of gravity (defense); providing foreign humanitarian assistance (stability); and providing military support to civilian authorities (support).

The JFC and component commanders determine the focus to place on each form of operation for each mission or phase of a campaign or major operation. As missions change from promoting peace to deterring war and from resolving conflict to war itself, the combinations of these operations require skillful assessment, planning, preparation, and execution. For example, within a combatant commander's operational area, one portion of the force may be executing large-scale offensive operations while another is conducting stability




Figure 3. Spectrum of Conflict




Figure 4. Full Spectrum Operations

operations. Or, within the operational area, forces may conduct stability operations simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations. Each major form of operation encompasses numerous subordinate types of operations.

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

There are numerous policy documents that are driving the concept of full spectrum dominance. To have full spectrum dominance the force must have the capability to conduct full spectrum operations, but full spectrum operations are not described in current joint doctrine. Combining the proposed ROMO on one axis with the major forms of military operations as they are integrated with the other instruments of national power provide a solid construct for full spectrum of operations (Figure 4). This allows JFCs to visualize, describe, and direct joint operations that are fully joint, and linked with other national agencies, and focused on the combatant commander's objectives at all levels.

JFCs conduct full spectrum operations to accomplish national objectives. Full spectrum operations combines ROMO with the forms of military operations and are integrated with other instruments of national power. This allows commanders to visualize and describe major forms of operations to accomplish specific objectives with the level of effort along the ROMO. This helps commanders focus appropriate joint force actions at the place and time needed to accomplish operational missions that promote or accomplish national goals. It also allows functional and geographic combatant commanders to synchronize operations with each other and the national objectives and general US national security goals in a coherent and understandable manner. This provides national authorities and combatant commanders a method of selecting, combining, and synchronizing operations in various parts of the globe as part of a integrated national strategy and joint campaign.



(Endnotes continued from page 17)

³ BDD, Page 3-1. *The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Maintenance of Morale, Offensive Action, Security, Surprise, Concentration of Force, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Cooperation, Sustainability.*

⁴ BDD. Levels of War; Strategic, Operational and Tactical.

⁵ Strategic Trends, JDCC 2003. The Strategic Environment is based on the complex interrelationship of the seven dimensions: Physical; Economic; Political; Military; Scientific and Technical; Social and Cultural; Legal, Ethical and Moral.

⁶ The UK Joint Vision dated 15 June 2001, page 2-8. *"An Effects-based approach needs identification of the effects that will lead to campaign success."*

⁷ Defence Strategic Guidance dated August 2003, para 5.22. *"We seek to develop in detail an effects based ... process that better encapsulates our understanding of actions and their influence on human behaviour, particularly the ability to create precise and discriminatory effect across all dimensions of the strategic environment."*

⁸ Delivering Security in a Changing World – Defence White Paper 2003, para 4,3. *"The SDR New Chapter helped to create a conceptual framework for an effects-based approach ... Further study has confirmed that this approach can be applied beyond a response to international terrorism, across the breadth of military capability."*

⁹ The EBOC will provide the conceptual headmark for the adoption of an effects-based approach to operations (including planning, execution and assessment).

¹⁰ JWP0-01.1 United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions.

¹¹ Principally consideration must be given to Effects realised by the 3 Instruments of Power; Diplomatic, Military and Economic, with Information enabling each of these Instruments.



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TERMINOLOGY

**By Mr. Tom Barrows, USJFCOM JWFC,
Doctrine Support Team (Cornerstone Industry Inc.)**

"The wise general in his deliberations must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors. By taking into account the favorable factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, he may resolve the difficulties."

Sun Tzu, "The Art of War"

"When we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to custom, with possession of the field."

Maurice de Saxe, "Mes Reveries," 1732

As you read this edition of *A Common Perspective*, the revision first draft (RFD) of JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is being staffed for worldwide review by the Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC). The JP 3-0 RFD introduces several new ideas and provides the related guidance in a rather straightforward fashion. Probably the biggest new idea is the inclusion of stability operations, the planning for which likely includes taking into account some of both the favorable and unfavorable factors noted by Sun Tzu. Stability operations are defined in the JP 3-0 RFD as "an overarching term encompassing specific types of developmental, cooperative, or coercive security cooperation and deterrence activities, small-scale operations, and/or missions that promote local or regional normalcy and protect US interests abroad. Stability operations may be conducted in all operational environments and during all phases of a campaign or major operation." It appears that Sun Tzu and Maurice de Saxe both understood the importance and role of what we now call stability operations. The specific definition of stability operations provided in the JP 3-0 RFD may be "tweaked" by some of the many would-be terminology experts out there, but the basic premise and implementing guidance seem pretty solid to me. We all need to take careful note of how the guidance for stability operations evolves—they will be a key enabler for achieving our goals, furthering our interests abroad, and defending ourselves at home.

The JP 3-0 RFD also introduces a new range of military operations that does not include military operations other than war or MOOTW, a term that has been around for several years. The essential doctrinal aspects of the old JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, have been incorporated in the JP 3-0 RFD. The consensus of the JDDC during development of the JP 3-0 RFD was that the term MOOTW had outlived its usefulness and needed to be replaced.

Although the Secretary of Defense personally directed that use of the terms "National Command Authorities" (NCA) and "commander in chief" (CINC)—when referring to the combatant commanders—be discontinued, the official action to remove them from our approved DOD terminology database has yet to be completed, but this should occur soon. I continue to personally observe several incorrect references to the combatant commands and combatant commanders as "COCOMs," including several references in documents originating on the Joint Staff. Remember—"COCOM" is the acronym for "combatant command (command authority)," which is the nontransferable command authority exercised by a combatant commander over assigned forces. Please do your best to correct this inappropriate usage.

As always, keep your powder dry and be careful out there.



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